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vAbstract
This dissertation addresses issues concerning liquidity and its volatility. It consists of 
two essays. The first essay, “Liquidity, Macro Factors and the U.S. Equity Flows to Emerging 
Markets”, examines the role of liquidity on equity flows from the U.S. to fifteen emerging 
markets around the world. Since liquidity has many dimensions, an emphasis is placed on 
utilizing various measures of liquidity. Moreover, both static and dynamic analyses, as well as 
short and long-horizon regressions, are performed to investigate the research questions. The 
results suggest that a liquid market attracts flows, after controlling for market size, political 
openness, exchange rate and other macro factors. Additionally, evidence indicates that the 
importance of liquidity varies across regions. For instance in the Asian region, the relation 
between equity flows and volume-related liquidity is weak while that between flows and price 
impacts of trading is strong. Evidence also supports the relevance of macro factors such as a 
country’s economic freedom.
The second essay, “Liquidity Risk Premium Puzzle and Possible Explanations”, attempts 
to resolve the liquidity risk puzzle: a negative relation between returns and liquidity risk, 
documented by Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001b), by employing alternative 
liquidity measures and by incorporating factors that might potentially affect the relation. The 
main findings are as follows. The relation between stock returns and volatility of liquidity 
depends on the measure of liquidity. When liquidity measures are based on trading volume, the 
results are largely mixed, but when liquidity is measured based on price impact of trading, the 
relation between returns and volatility of price impacts is positive, as expected. The results are 
sensitive to time periods examined. Moreover, during extreme down markets, the aversion to 
liquidity volatility is lower, suggesting behavioral bias might potentially address the puzzle.  
Empirical findings also suggest that liquidity risk premium tends to be greater for small stocks. 
Finally, when the VIX index is included as a proxy for investor sentiment, the results indicate
that the relation between returns and liquidity risk is significantly positive in four out of five 
liquidity measures. In sum, the empirical analysis partially but not completely addresses the 
puzzle.
Keywords: Emerging Market, Equity Flows, Liquidity, Liquidity Risk Premium Puzzle, Market 
Conditions, Investor Sentiment
1Chapter One: Introduction
This dissertation addresses issues concerning liquidity and its volatility. It consists of 
two essays. One of them examines the relation between U.S. equity flows to emerging markets 
and various macro factors, particularly the liquidity of emerging markets. The other paper 
attempts to resolve the liquidity risk puzzle: a negative relation between returns and liquidity 
risk. 
The first essay, presented in Chapter Two, is “Liquidity, Macro Factors and the U.S. 
Equity Flows to Emerging Markets”.  Liquidity in emerging stock markets is typically low and 
may be a major concern to foreign investors. This essay examines the role of liquidity on equity 
flows from the U.S. to fifteen emerging markets around the world, for the period of 1995 to 
2002. Since liquidity has many dimensions, an emphasis is placed on utilizing various measures 
of liquidity. Moreover, both static and dynamic analyses, as well as short and long-horizon 
regressions, are performed to investigate the research questions. The results suggest that a liquid 
market attracts flows, after controlling for market size, political openness, exchange rate and 
other macro factors. Additionally, evidence indicates that the importance of liquidity varies 
across regions. For instance in the Asian region, the relation between equity flows and volume-
related liquidity is weak while that between flows and price impacts of trading is strong, 
reinforcing the notion that there are multiple dimensions in liquidity. Evidence also supports the 
relevance of macro factors such as a country’s economic freedom.
The second essay is “Liquidity Risk Premium Puzzle and Possible Explanations”. This 
study attempts to resolve the liquidity risk puzzle: a negative relation between returns and 
liquidity risk, documented by Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001b), by employing 
alternative liquidity measures and by incorporating factors that might potentially affect the 
relation. The sample covers the period 1975 to 2008 and the total number of firm-month 
observations is 415,403. The main findings are as follows. The relation between stock returns 
and volatility of liquidity depends on the measure of liquidity. When liquidity measures are 
based on trading volume, the results are largely mixed, but when liquidity is measured based on 
price impact of trading, the relation between returns and volatility of price impacts is positive, as 
expected. Moreover, the results are sensitive to time periods examined. The second part of the
study incorporates potential factors that might affect the relation between returns and liquidity 
volatility. The results indicate that during extreme down markets, the aversion to liquidity 
2volatility is lower, suggesting behavioral bias might potentially address the puzzle.  Empirical 
findings also suggest a firm size effect; specifically, liquidity risk premium tends to be greater 
for small stocks. Finally, when the VIX index is included as a proxy for investor sentiment, the 
results indicate that the relation between returns and liquidity risk is significantly positive in four 
out of five liquidity measures. In sum, the empirical analysis partially but not completely 
addresses the puzzle.
3Chapter Two:
Liquidity, Macro Factors and the U.S. Equity Flows to Emerging Markets
I. Introduction
The financial crises during 1997-99 highlight the effects and importance of cross-border 
capital flows. Some studies attempt to examine factors that influence international equity 
investment flows. Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) and Gelos and Wei (2005) find that 
equity flows and transparency are correlated, while Edison and Warnock (2003a) suggest that 
flows are affected by capital control and cross-border listing, controlling for macro factors such 
as relative stock performances. Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2001) also provide an 
overview of mutual fund investments in emerging markets. They find that equity flows to 
emerging markets are volatile. Not emphasized in these studies is the potentially important role 
of liquidity on equity flows, which is somewhat surprising given that the literature on market 
microstructure generally indicates that liquidity has important effects on pricing, portfolio 
holdings, and trading1.  Emerging markets are largely illiquid because of their limited access to 
world capital markets. Thus, market liquidity is likely to be important from the perspective of 
foreign investors, which motivates this research. Specifically, we are raising the question 
whether liquidity also influences equity flows.
Most of the extant empirical liquidity literature focuses on the U.S. market.  With the 
increasing availability of data regarding trading on emerging markets in recent years, researchers 
are able to take a closer look at the liquidity of these markets, where liquidity may be a major
concern. Indeed, Lesmond (2005) indicates that liquidity varies considerably across emerging 
markets. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) point out that trading volume based liquidity 
proxy in emerging markets does not predict future returns but some other liquidity measures do, 
while Jun, Marathe, and Shawky (2003) find a positive correlation between returns and turnover 
in emerging markets.  These findings reinforce the idea that liquidity has many dimensions, 
including trading costs, trading frequency, trading intensity, and price impacts.  With this in 
mind, we employ several measures of liquidity to determine whether foreign investors desire 
liquidity; if so, it should be reflected by their investment flows to emerging markets.  However, 
                                                
1 These include, among many other studies, the seminal work by Kyle (1985) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
More recent papers such as Acharya and Pedersen (2005) decompose liquidity risk and further confirm that liquidity
risk affects asset prices.
4due to the unavailability of data on trading costs, our liquidity measures primarily capture trading 
frequency, trading intensity, and price impacts of trading. Essentially, this study also investigates 
whether or not the different dimensions of liquidity measures are consistently influencing equity 
flows.
In addition to the relation between equity flows and liquidity, this study considers the 
correlations between equity flows and various macro factors including market size, prior market 
excess returns, country’s economic freedom, capital control, changes in exchange rate, and 
trading restrictions.  Most factors are shown by various papers to affect equity flows to emerging 
markets.  In brief, this study is comprehensive in terms of the number of factors being 
considered. We expect that the above-mentioned factors, as well as liquidity, are correlated with 
the U.S. equity flows to emerging markets. The different measures of liquidity may result in 
different impacts on equity flows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the most 
related research, followed by a section describing the hypotheses. Following that, we describe 
the data, variables, and various measures of liquidity in Section IV. Methodology and empirical 
results are presented in Sections V. Section VI contains concluding remarks. 
II. Related Literature 
II. A. Possible Macro Factors Affecting Equity Flows 
II. A. 1. Country Equity Market Return
Earlier studies on equity flows to emerging markets focus on the relevance of 
macroeconomic variables especially stock market returns.  In an early study that covers both 
emerging and developed countries, Bohn and Tesar (1996) document no strong relation between 
stock returns and equity flows.  Brennan and Cao (1997) theorize that, when foreign investors 
face an information disadvantage, they tend to chase foreign returns; that is, buy when foreign 
returns are high and sell when returns are low.  Using data on several emerging markets in early 
1990s,2 they find evidence supportive of their model.  Using daily flow data from one investment 
firm, Froot, O’Connel, and Seasholes (2001) present evidence also consistent with flows being 
affected by past returns.  Additionally, they document that flows have predictive power for future 
returns.  More recently, Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2002) provide an empirical investigation
                                                
2 Generally, early 1990s is when data on emerging markets first became available.
5using daily fund flow data, which they obtain directly from exchanges from nine emerging 
markets.  They find that equity flows are positively correlated to past host country returns as well 
as home country returns.  That is, the evidence suggests that equity flows are both pushed and 
pulled by related market returns; however, the effects are relatively short-lived—present only in 
daily data but not so with the use of weekly data.  Overall, the evidence concerning the effects of 
market returns are not conclusive.  
II. A. 2. Market Openness
Edison and Warnock (2003b) find that flows are related to the degree of capital control, 
as well as economic conditions proxied by interest rates.  They point out that the intensity of 
capital control indicates the openness to foreign investment, which in turn measures a 
government’s commitment to free market policies. Their evidence suggests that markets are 
more likely to be viable if they have less restriction imposed on foreign investors. 
II. A. 3. Country Risk
Country risk, such as political risk, exchange rate movement, economic risk, etc, affects 
the investment climate within a country and the allocation of foreign investment. Extant 
literature explores various indicators for country risk and their impacts on international trading. 
Here we highlight country political risk, exchange rate movement, stock market transparency, 
investor protection, and economic freedom as components of country risk.
Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) find a link between cross-border investments and 
political risk and suggest that political stability is necessary to support free market development 
and attract and retain long-term sources of capital. 
Blonigen (1997) states that exchange rates movements play an important role in 
influencing foreign direct investment. A country’s exchange rate regime developed by Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2003) is used as an indicator of whether the exchange rate is pegged, managed float, 
or floating. 
Gelos and Wei (2005) use the Global Competitiveness Report to measure transparency3
and point out that fund inflows are on average greater in countries and in firms with a greater 
                                                
3 Financial transparency refers to investors’ access to truthful, accurate and relevant information on the conditions in 
the countries and companies in which they are investing. Gelos and Wei (2005) develop a transparency index for 
each country and firm, based on several surveys conducted by International Monetary Fund and 
6degree of transparency.  Moreover, some studies also use accounting standards4 as another proxy 
for transparency. For example, Aggarwal et al. (2005) utilize both country-level and firm-level 
data on corporate governance including accounting standards.  Based on U.S. fund holdings in 
2002, they find that funds tend to invest more in countries with stronger accounting standards 
and shareholder protections.  
Partly in response to the crisis in confidence regarding corporate governance, a few 
recent papers examine the role of corporate governance in equity flows across countries, starting 
with the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1997) that establishes a link 
between share holdings and shareholder protection.5  Wurgler (2000) further finds that capital is 
more efficiently allocated in countries with better legal protection for minority investors and 
more firm-specific information in domestic stock returns. 
Economic freedom measures country’s economic performance and the consistency of its
institutions and policies. Kim (2008) points out that greater economic freedom implies fewer
barriers to economic activities and tends to generate more opportunities for people and create
lasting prosperity. 
II. A. 4. Trading Restrictions
Both trading restrictions and liquidity are important considerations for traders that place a 
high value on liquidity. We consider short-selling restrictions as another important aspect for the 
ease of trading.  Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) present evidence that short-selling constraints 
affect a market’s degree of efficiency.  They find that prices reflect negative information faster in 
countries where short-selling is practiced.  In that paper, they carefully collect information about 
short-selling practices in various countries and construct a short-selling indicator, which we 
utilize here. Moreover, Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004) find that the portion of a 
                                                                                                                                                            
PricewaterhouseCoopers from late 1990s and early 2000s. Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000)3 show that R2 and other 
measures of stock market synchronicity, as alternative measures of transparency, are higher in countries with less 
developed financial systems and poorer corporate governance. They also point out that R2 is inversely related to the 
degree of investor protection.
4 Accounting standards indicate the extent to which publicly traded companies in the country utilize either US 
GAAP or IAS in financial reporting, and whether the country is a member of the International Accounting Standards 
Council.
5 Daouk, Lee and Ng (2006) further show that good governance reduces cost of capital and increases liquidity and 
pricing efficiency. 
7country’s market that has a public U.S. listing is a major determinant of a country’s weight in 
U.S. investors’ portfolio. 
II. B. The Role of Liquidity
Some literature provides evidence that market liquidity has important effect on risk of 
emerging market investment and, therefore, on the future returns. As Bekaert et al. (2002) find, 
liquidity measure significantly predicts future returns and equity market liberalization 
significantly improves the level of liquidity. As a result, the increasing investment interest in 
emerging markets relative to developed markets yields spectacular returns, which are subject to 
increased risk and are significantly reduced by the increased illiquidity of trading stocks in 
emerging markets.  
As mentioned in the introduction, studies such as Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert et al. 
(2007) suggest that liquidity has many dimensions.  Lesmond (2005) indicates that liquidity 
varies considerably across emerging markets.  He finds that price-based measures of liquidity are 
more correlated with transaction costs compared to those based on trading volume.  Similarly, 
Bekaert et al. (2007) present evidence that trading volume based liquidity proxy in emerging 
markets does not predict future returns while some other liquidity measures do.  In addition, 
Amihud (2002) measures market illiquidity as the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar 
volume averaged over some period and points out that expected market illiquidity positively 
affects ex ante stock excess return, whereas Jun et al. (2003) document a positive correlation 
between returns and turnover in the markets for emerging countries, a puzzling result contrary to 
the existence of liquidity premium. 
Literature indicates the multiple dimensions of liquidity measure: trading costs, trading 
frequency, trading intensity, and price impacts.  While some studies on equity flows include 
share turnover as a control variable, there is no study that considers the possibility that one single 
liquidity measure might not completely capture a country’s stock market liquidity.  
Consequently, we use three different measures of liquidity in this study, detailed in Section IV.
In addition, some studies suggest that the size of market can be a proxy for liquidity, thus we also 
include market size as an alternative measure of liquidity. On the other hand, market size can 
also serve as a proxy for market visibility or transparency. Therefore, we consider the variable 
market size.  
8III. Our Major Hypothesis
If investors demand liquidity, then markets/stocks with greater liquidity likely will attract 
more attention and investments. Specifically, we hypothesize that 
 Emerging countries with more liquid equity market and less trading restrictions are likely 
to be associated with higher equity inflows from the U.S. investors. The results are 
expected to be robust with respect to multi-dimensions liquidity measures. 
Based on previous literature, we expect the relation between equity flows and prior 
country market excess returns6 to be positive due to trading feedback. We also expect that capital 
control is negatively correlated with the U.S. equity flows into emerging markets. Also, higher 
equity flows from U.S. to emerging markets would be associated with higher local market 
capitalization, greater economic freedom, and favorable exchange rate movements. 
IV. Data 
IV. A. Data on U.S. Equity Flows
The primary data source for the U.S. equity flows to emerging markets is the U.S. 
Treasury International Capital (TIC) Reporting System, which reports portfolio equity flows 
from the U.S. to emerging countries.  The flow data is available at the monthly frequency.  In 
this study the U.S. equity flows to a given emerging market are the U.S. residents gross 
purchases of foreign stocks from residents of that country scaled by the country’s GDP. Figure 1 
present the U.S. equity inflows into our fifteen sample emerging countries. Obviously, equity 
flows vary considerably across countries. During the sample period the U.S. investors purchase a 
larger amount of equities from Latin America, specifically Brazil and Mexico, than from the 
other two regions, as shown in Figure 2.
IV. B. Data on Various Macro Factors
The data on various explanatory variables are collected from multiple sources. Table AI 
in Appendix provides details of data sources. Our sample7 consists of fifteen emerging markets
                                                
6 Edison and Warnock (2003a) find evidence that investors are chasing prospective returns, as proxied by dividend 
yields, but not past returns. Moreover, the evidence on past-returns-chasing behavior is mixed. Using monthly data, 
Bohn and Tesar (1996) find that investors chase past returns in 7 of 22 markets. 
7 We also analyze annual data. The empirical results are not reported.
9for the period between January 1995 and December 2002.  These emerging countries are 
classified into three subgroups based on regions: Latin America Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, and Peru, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Israel, Poland, South Africa, and Turkey, and 
Asia Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Korea. Due to data
unavailability, data is incomplete for some variables under investigation.
The monthly data analysis includes the following control variables: country stock market 
size, the past excess country market return, countries’ economic freedom, capital control, 
exchange rate movement, and short-selling restriction. These variables are selected based on the 
earlier discussions of literature and described as follows:
1) Market Size: It is measured by country equity market capitalization as a percentage of
country’s GDP, both denominated in current U.S. dollars. As mentioned earlier, market size can 
be a proxy for liquidity. 
2) Prior Excess Local Stock Market Returns8: The excess return is computed by 
subtracting the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks from the local 
stock market return. Table AII in Appendix contains the information regarding the local stock
markets of the fifteen emerging countries. 
3) Country’s Economic Freedom9: The index of economic freedom is based on ten 
components of economic freedom which represents openness to the global commerce, 
transparency, and the rule of law, and rated on a scale of zero (least free) to 100 (most free). 
Also, a higher score implies a lower level of government interference in the marketplace. The 
natural logarithm of the index is used for regression analysis. 
4) Capital Control10: It represents changes in foreign ownership restriction or the intensity 
of capital controls, which is presented by Edison and Warnock (2003b). The measure of capital 
control can vary from zero to one, with zero representing a completely open market with no 
restrictions, and a value of one indicating that the market is completely closed. However, their 
data only covers the period from January 1989 to December 2000.  
                                                
8 Some studies use dividend yield to estimate prior equity market performance. We use it in our annual data analysis. 
Bekaert et al. (2002) use lagged excess returns (excess of the foreign market over the U.S. market) in their study. 
9 Our study excludes the measure of transparency because the data on transparency is fairly limited and seldom 
undated in emerging markets. Because currently the International Accounting Standards are undergoing significant 
revisions, we do not analyze the impact of accounting standard either. 
10 Because the data used to compute capital control is propriety data which is not accessible to the general public, we 
take the data from Edison and Warnock (2003b).    
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5) Changes in Exchange Rate11: Presumably exchange rate movements affect U.S. capital 
flows; therefore, we compute the changes in the exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar over 
the past month by taking natural logarithm of the current exchange rate over the past rate, where 
exchange rate is stated as the number of foreign currencies per U.S. dollar.
6) Trading Restriction12: The dummy variable used here takes on the value of one when 
short-selling is practiced in country and zero otherwise (either short sales are not allowed or not 
practiced).   
IV. C. Measurements of Liquidity
To account for various liquidity dimensions, three alternative measures of liquidity are 
taken into account: 
1) Trading Frequency13: It is denoted by market turnover, TURNOVER, which is the 
ratio of the value of shares traded to the value of shares outstanding. 
2) Trading Dollar Volume: We use two ways to calculate trading volume: taking natural 
logarithm of the value of share traded14, denoted by TRADVOL_1; the share trading value as a 
percentage of country’s GDP, denoted by TRADVOL_215.   
3) Price Impact: It represents the absolute monthly price change per dollar of monthly 
trading volume, or say, the monthly price impact of the order flow, which serves as a rough 
measure of price impact and reflects stock illiquidity. Following Amihud (2002), we calculate 
the monthly price impact for each emerging country market by dividing the absolute value of 
monthly stock market price changes by the dollar value traded for that month. It can be written
as:
ti
titi
ti TradedDollar
ppln|
Impact  riceP
,
1,,
,
|)/(  , where i denotes individual country and t denotes month. 
We use three different price indexes to calculate price impact: 
                                                
11 Data on exchange rate regime developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) is not accessible to the public. 
12The number of ADR or ADR issuance can be another proxy of trading restriction, since firms in emerging 
countries may be more inclined to choose to issue ADRs or GDRs. According to Aggarwal et al. (2005), we can 
calculate the percentage of market value of firms that issue ADRs relative to the total market value of all listed 
firms, or the percentage of listed firms that issue ADRs. This is left for further research if the data is accessible.
13 It can also be measured by the ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding. However, we do not 
obtain monthly data on these two variables.
14 Share trading value is the total number of shares traded multiplied by their respective prices. 
15 This measure is on an economy-wide basis since it gauges the positive effects of liquidity as a share of national 
output.
11
PRIIMPACT_1i,t is the absolute value of the International Finance Corporation’s Global 
(IFCG) price change over dollar value traded on month t, where IFCG index captures the return 
of mostly large firms, specifically it covers all publicly listed equities with float-adjusted market 
values of US $100 million or more and annual dollar value traded of at least US $50 million;
PRIIMPACT_2i,t is the absolute value of the International Finance Corporation’s 
Investable (IFCI) return over dollar value traded on month t, where IFCI represent the investable 
index available to foreign investors16; The difference between PRIIMPACT_1 and 2 is the 
number of restricted shares (restricted from foreign investors).
PRIIMPACT_3i,t is the absolute value of return of the value-weighted composite 
(including all stocks) market index over dollar value traded on month t. The difference between 
this and measures 1 and 2 is the representation of smaller firms’ stocks.
The graphs on our measures of three dimensions of liquidity by regions are presented in 
Figures 3 - 5. The figures show that Asia has the highest TURNOVER and Latin America has the
lowest among the three regions during our sample period. Furthermore, Latin America has larger
PRIIMPACT than the other two across the sample period. These results point out that Asian
market is more liquid than Latin America and Europe, Africa, and Middle East markets.
As hypothesized, the coefficients of TURNOVER, TRADVOL_1, and TRADVOL_2 are 
expected to be positive, and the coefficients of PRIIMPACT_1i,t, PRIIMPACT_2i,t, and 
PRIIMPACT_3i,t expected to be negative. 
IV. D. Summary Statistics
Table I Panel A reports descriptive statistics for equity flows, various control variables, 
and six measures of liquidity employed by this study. The average gross equity flow from the 
U.S. investors to the sample emerging markets is $286.87 million and the median flow is 
substantially lower at $114 million, suggesting that the distribution of equity flows is positively 
skewed. The average equity flow is 0.108 percent of country’s GDP. The mean values of one-
month ahead and the average twelve-month-ahead equity flows are 0.109 percent and 0.115 
percent of GDP, respectively. The average market size scaled by GDP is 0.562. Panel B of Table 
                                                
16 Edison and Warnock (2003b) suggest that for a given country the IFCG index is designed to represent the overall 
market portfolio, while the IFCI index represent a portfolio available to foreign investors. The latter excludes from 
the IFCG those stocks not available to foreigners due to either legal restrictions or low liquidity.
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1 reports the average U.S equity flows and market capitalizations by country and regions. 
Although Asia has the largest market size, the U.S. investors prefer Latin American market. 
The average local stock market return, the U.S. value-weighted market return on 
NYSE/AMES/NASDAQ, and the excess return are 1.4 percent, 0.9 percent, and 0.5 percent, 
respectively. The distribution of the excess return is positively skewed, and the middle 80 
percent of the excess return lie between -10.2 percent and 10.3 percent, representing a spread of 
20.5 percent during January 1995 and December 2002. Regarding the liquidity measures, the
mean, median, and 10th and 90th percentiles are of similar magnitude for all measures of 
liquidity except TRADVOL_1.
The correlations17 among the variables are shown in Panel C of Table 1. Most correlation 
coefficients confirm our expectations: the U.S. equity flows are positively correlated with market 
size, country stock market excess return, deregulations of short-selling restriction, turnover, and 
trading volumes; and negatively correlated with capital control, changes in exchange rate, and 
price impact. Panel D presents the correlations among the alternative measures of liquidity. As 
expected, TURNOVER and TRADVOL_1 and TRADVOL_2 are highly correlated but far from 
perfect, and these three are negatively related with PRICEIMPACT_1, PRICEIMPACT_2, and
PRICEIMPACT_3.
                                                
17 The correlation tables for each region are also made but not reported. With few exceptions, the correlations are of 
similar magnitude.
13
Table I. Summary Statistics for Various Variables, Jan. 1995 – Dec. 2002
EQUITYFLOWS ($ millions) is the gross equity flows from U.S. investors to foreign markets. 
EQUITYFLOWt, EQUITYFLOW(t+1)/1, and EQUITYFLOW(t+12)/12 are the gross equity flows scaled by 
country’s GDP in a specific month t, one month ahead, and the average twelve-month ahead, respectively. 
SIZE is the market capitalization as a percentage of GDP.  RETURN, VWUSRET, and EXCESSRET are 
country local stock market return, value-weight U.S. market return on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, and the 
excess return of local stock market, respectively. ECONFREE is the natural logarithm of the index of 
country economic freedom. CAPLCONS is the intensity of capital controls. EXCHG is the change in 
exchange rate. SSDUMMY is short-selling restriction dummy variable. TURNOVER is the ratio of the 
value of share traded to market capitalization. TRADVOL_1 is the natural logarithm of the value of share 
traded. TRADVOL_2 is the value of share traded as a percentage of GDP.  PRIIMPACT_1 is the absolute 
value of the IFCG price change over dollar value traded. PRIIMPACT_2 is the absolute value of the IFCI 
price change over dollar value traded.  PRIIMPACT_3 is the absolute value of local stock market price 
change over dollar value traded.
Table I. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for U.S. equity flows, various control 
variables, and liquidity measures. The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean Median 10th Percentile 90th Percentile
EQUITYFLOWS 1440 286.87 114 21.10 794.80
EQUITYFLOWt 1440 0.108 0.080 0.016 0.227
EQUITYFLOW(t+1)/1 1440 0.109 0.080 0.016 0.227
EQUITYFLOW(t+12)/12 1440 0.115 0.088 0.023 0.221
SIZE 1403 0.562 0.329 0.138 1.377
RETURN 1404 0.014 0.002 -0.104 0.122
VWUSRET 1404 0.009 0.019 -0.059 0.066
EXCESSRET 1404 0.005 -0.006 -0.102 0.103
ECONFREE 1440 4.164 4.156 4.038 4.291
CAPLCONS 1008 0.252 0.149 -0.012 0.656
EXCHG 1389 0.010 0.002 -0.022 0.047
SSDUMMY 1440 0.531 1 0 1
LIQUIDITY
TURNOVER 1403 0.061 0.034 0.011 0.166
TRADVOL_1 1404 7.825 7.802 5.845 10.105
TRADVOL_2 1404 0.034 0.012 0.003 0.087
PRIIMPACT_1 1082 0.099 0.025 0.002 0.225
PRIIMPACT_2 1082 0.103 0.026 0.002 0.239
PRIIMPACT_3 1404 0.075 0.020 0.001 0.153
Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.
14
Table I. Panel B presents the average U.S. equity flows in millions of dollars to each emerging 
market and region, and the average market capitalization in millions of dollars of each country 
and region during January 1995 and December 2002
Panel B. U.S. Equity Flows vs. Country Market Cap.
Country
U.S. Equity Outflows                     
($ millions)
Market Capitalization           
($ millions)
Latin America 474 90,177
Argentina 287 42,389
Brazil 1,188 192,780
Chile 81 64,112
Mexico 768 119,946
Peru 45 11,788
Europe, Africa, Middle East 137 83,555
Israel 257 48,024
Poland 23 18,199
South Africa 115 219,854
Turkey 155 48,144
Asia, Pacific 231 128,963
Indonesia 84 45,651
Malaysia 164 162,340
Philippine 63 40,584
South Korea 566 172,121
Taiwan 445 277,668
Thailand 62 64,367
Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.
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Table I. Panel C reports the panel data correlation coefficients between equity flows and the various explanatory variables. 
Panel C. Correlations
EQUITYFLOWt EQUITYFLOW(t+12)/12 EQUITYFLOW(t+1)/1 SIZE EXCESSRET ECONFREE CAPLCONS EXCHG SSDUMMY
EQUITYFLOW(t+12)/12 0.53
EQUITYFLOW(t+1)/1 0.58 0.60
SIZE 0.24 0.26 0.25
EXCESSRET 0.02 0.09 0.05 -0.01
ECONFREE -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.27 -0.07
CAPLCONS -0.16 -0.10 -0.15 -0.11 -0.01 -0.01
EXCHG -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01
SSDUMMY 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.04 0.08 -0.42 -0.10 0.01
TURNOVER 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.23 0.43 -0.03 -0.28
TRADVOL_1 0.30 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.05 -0.05 0.44 -0.05 0.02
TRADVOL_2 0.17 0.23 0.16 0.40 0.03 0.29 0.33 -0.04 -0.23
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.21 -0.26 -0.19 -0.23 -0.04 0.09 -0.20 0.15 -0.14
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.21 -0.25 -0.19 -0.23 -0.03 0.09 -0.21 0.14 -0.14
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.19 -0.22 -0.17 -0.21 0.05 0.08 -0.21 0.05 -0.14
   Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.
Table I. Panel D reports the correlation coefficients among the alternative measures of liquidity. 
Panel D. Correlation among Liquidity Measures
TURNOVER TRADVOL_1 TRADVOL_2 PRIIMPACT_1 PRIIMPACT_2 PRIIMPACT_3
TURNOVER 1
TRADVOL_1 0.73 1
TRADVOL_2 0.90 0.70 1
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.18 -0.49 -0.17 1
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.18 -0.50 -0.17 1.00 1
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.17 -0.48 -0.16 0.75 0.75 1
Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.
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V. Methodology and Empirical Results
V. A. Time-Series Cross-Section Data Analysis
V. A. 1. The Model
As mentioned earlier, this study focuses on the impact of various macro factors, 
especially liquidity, on the U.S. equity flows into emerging markets. We conduct a time series-
cross section data18 framework which allows us to analyze time series properties of the data and 
identify individual country effects. The country effect model that we estimate is of the following 
type:
itiit
M
k
itkkit LIQUIDXy  
1
, (1)
where 
o yit denotes the U.S. equity flows of country i at time t;  i=1, 2, … N is a country index;
t=1,2,…,T is a time index.
o Xk,it denotes the explanatory variables including control variables of country i at time t; k
= 1, 2, …M the number of explanatory variables.
The control variables include various macro factors: market size SIZEi, t, prior foreign 
stock market excess returns EXCESSRETi, t-1, country economic freedom ECONFREEi,t, capital 
control CAPLCONSi, t, change of exchange rate EXCHGi, t, and the dummy variable on short-
selling restriction SSDUMMYi, t
o LIQUIDit denotes the alternative measures of liquidity of country i at time t;
Alternative measures of liquidity are trading frequency TURNOVERi,t, dollar trading 
volume TRADVOL_1i,t and TRADVOL_2i,t, and price impact PRIIMPACT_1i,t, PRIIMPACT_2i,t, 
and PRIIMPACT_3i,t
o βk and γ denote the coefficients of Xk,it and LIQUIDit, respectively. We assume that βk and 
γ are the same from one country to the next.
o α is the intercept
o it is the combined time series and cross-country error component, or the observation-
specific errors.
                                                
18 Our panel data is unbalanced (some countries do not have data for one or more months, or not all countries have 
data for all months)
17
o i is an unobserved variable and varies across countries but not over time. The country-
specific effects can be treated as fixed or as random. With the fixed-effect model, i is 
assumed to be correlated with the regressors and represents the country-specific 
characteristics19, and i is the intercept specific for each country. With the random-
effect model, i is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors and represents the 
country-specific error component i.e., differences across countries are captured through 
the disturbance term, and iti  is the error term, where ),0(~ 2 IIDi and 
),0(~ 2vit IID  .
Since each country has its own individual characteristics that may influence or bias some 
or all the explanatory variables and/or the predicted equity inflows, the pooled OLS regression 
model may yield biased coefficients because it does not account for those unobservable time-
invariant20 country-specific characteristics. We use a Fixed-Effect (FE) estimation21 approach to 
verify whether the inclusion of country-specific characteristics in the model is valid. F-tests of 
the presence of country-specific effects reject the null hypothesis that  iall shown in Table 
II. Therefore, the time series-cross section data are not poolable with respect to country.
To decide which estimation, fixed or random effects, is superior to the other, we further 
perform a Hausman test22. The results are reported in Table II, indicating that the fixed-effect is 
an appropriate estimator for all regression models in the full sample and Latin America, the 
models (1) and (7) in Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, and the models (1) – (4) and (7)
in Asia samples. Thus, we use random-effect estimation for the other models. However, we use 
the OLS estimation for the models (5) and (6) in Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, 
because the data on the liquidity measures of PRIIMPACT_1 and PRIIMPACT_2 are only 
                                                
19 Time-invariant country characteristics (fixed effects), such as culture, language, geography and demographics, 
may be correlated with the explanatory variables. National policies, federal regulations, and international 
agreements, may change over time but not across countries.
20 We assume that the country-specific characteristics are time-invariant. 
21 It is equivalent to the least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimation, where the test associated with individual 
group is the test that all of the dummy variables are zero
22 Hausman test: the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects and the alternative is the fixed 
effects (Greene, 2000) or the unique errors (ui) are correlated with the regressors. If the null is rejected, then the RE 
estimators are biased. Random-Effect is usually preferred when the panel has large number of entities.
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available for one country. We also test if cross-sectional variances23 equal to zero for those 
models estimated by random-effects. The p-values reject the null for models (5) and (6) in Asia 
sample, meaning that there are country-specific error component. The p-values are not rejected 
for models (2) to (4) in Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, indicating that there is no 
individual effect for these three models and the pooled regression model is appropriate. 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity24 in the residuals of the fixed-effect
model is also performed reported in Table II. The null hypothesis is constant variance for all
countries. The rejected null indicates that the error variances are specific to the individual 
country. Therefore, we need to control for the effects of the unobserved heteroskedasticity for 
both fixed and random-effects by adjusting the regression standard errors for clustering on 
country.
In addition, we perform Wooldridge test25 for autocorrelation in our time series-cross 
sectional data. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation for models is rejected in the full
sample and Latin America sample, as well as models (3), (4), and (7) in Europe, Africa, and 
Middle East sample and models (5) and (6) in Asia sample at the 5 percent significant level. The 
p-value is reported in Table II where we can see that with very few exceptions, most test 
statistics are not highly significant. Basically, there is no serial correlation in models (1) and (2)
for Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample. For Asia sample, there is no serial correlation for all 
models except models (5) and (6). The serial correlation test indicates that for some of the 
sample countries the errors within countries are correlated across time. Therefore, we also 
compute Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control for both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. The results indicate that there is a very slight difference between the robust standard 
errors mentioned earlier and the Newey-West standard errors, and the difference does not affect 
the statistical significance of each coefficient; consequently we only report robust standard errors 
in Table II. 
                                                
23 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multipliers test helps us on the selection of the appropriate model (pooled vs. 
individual effects). If the null of cross-sectional variance of i equals to zero: 02  is not rejected, the pooled 
regression model is appropriate. We also test if the variance components for time are zero. The null is rejected at 5 
to 10 percent significance levels. 
24 The modified Wald test allows for unbalanced panels (as ours).
25 It is a test for serial correlation in linear panel data models. The null hypothesis is the residuals from the 
regression of the first-differenced variables should have an autocorrelation of -0.5.
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V. A. 2. Results on Control Variables
Table II four panels shows, separately, the regression results for full sample, Latin 
America sample, Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, and Asia sample. For each individual 
panel, we perform seven regression models, each with a different measure of liquidity except for 
model (1) which only includes control variables. 
The coefficient of SIZE is significantly positive in all models except models (3) and (4) in
the Latin America sample. It is consistent with the notion that a larger market likely attracts more 
investors. As mentioned earlier, SIZE may proxy for liquidity to some extent, since larger 
markets also tend to be more liquid. To the extent this argument is true, the results on SIZE is in 
agreement with the hypothesis that a more liquid market attracts more equity flows. 
Based on the result on EXCESSRETt-1, there appears to be no evidence supporting return 
chasing behavior: among all four samples, only six models in Asia sample indicate a positive but 
insignificant coefficient. Interestingly, the coefficient of EXCESSRETt-1 is negative and 
statistically significant in all models of the full sample and Latin America sample, as well as in 
models (3) and (4) of Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample. Also, the coefficients are 
remarkably close across samples. EXCESSRETt-126 here is the past excess country stock market 
return over the U.S. value-weighted stock market return. The empirical evidence indicates that a 
decrease in the past excess return of emerging stock market, especially in Latin America market,
leads to an increase in immediate purchases of foreign equities by the U.S. investors. This 
suggests that some investors behave more like contrarians than momentum chasers. While this 
appears to be inconsistent with previous studies, investors’ strategies might depend on the time 
horizon since Griffin et al. (2002) indicate that return-chasing behavior is short-lived. It should 
be noted that the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis27 of EXCESSRET for Latin America 
sample are much larger than those for the other two regions. Also, we suspect that some 
unobserved variables, such as geographic preference, may correlate with one or some of 
explanatory variables, e.g., EXCESSRET. 
The impact of country market economic freedom, ECONFREE, on equity flows is 
positive and statistically significant in all models of the full sample and both Latin America and 
                                                
26 Analysis was also performed in sub-periods, but not reported. Except the coefficients on excess return, others 
remain largely unchanged for sub-periods.
27 Not reported.
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Europe, Africa, and Middle East samples. This result is consistent with our expectation that 
equity flows are larger for the country with more economic freedom. However, for the Asian
sample, the coefficient of ECONFREE is negative but insignificant. We check the correlations 
between ECONFREE and other explanatory variables for the Asian sample and do not see any 
correlation more than 0.3. Thus, the counter-intuitive result on ECONFREE in the Asian market 
is unlikely to be caused by multicollinearity. Overall, economic freedom of emerging countries, 
particularly those in Latin America and Europe, Africa, and Middle East, plays a significant role 
in attracting foreign equity inflows. 
As for CAPLCONS, its coefficient is significantly negative in all models for the full 
sample, Latin America, and Asia samples, which is consistent with our expectation. However, in 
models (1) to (4) and (7) of Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, the coefficient of
CAPLCONS has a positive and statistically significant value. It should be noted that the region of 
Europe, Africa, and Middle East includes relatively fewer countries and some data is lacking for 
a couple of countries there. These may affect the estimates for CAPLCONS in that region. With 
the exception of this region, our evidence in general indicates that a loosening of foreign 
ownership restriction expands the investment opportunity and leads to an increased purchases of 
foreign equity by U.S. investors.
If the value of U.S. dollar is increasing (decreasing) then the U.S. investors can afford to 
invest more (less). However, if the trend is fairly predictable, an increasing (decreasing) dollar 
would encourage the U.S. investors to purchase less (more) foreign securities. Consequently, we 
make no specific prediction regarding the coefficient of the variable representing exchange rate 
movements. Indeed, the results are mixed concerning exchange rate movements: all models in 
the full sample and the Asian sample, and models (1) and (5) to (7) in Europe, Africa, and 
Middle East sample show a positive impact. In Latin America, the impact is negative but not
statistically significant. Moreover, the results indicate a positive and statistically significant
impact in models (2) to (4) for Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample. On the other hand, the 
empirical results in the next section show that there is statistically significant and negative 
relation between the changes in exchange rates and the long-horizon equity flows in the full
sample and most models in Latin America sample. We elaborate on this issue further in next 
section.
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As mentioned earlier, foreign investors should prefer an emerging market where short 
selling is allowed; hence a positive relation between short selling dummy and equity flows is 
expected. Our evidence indicates that the impact of short-selling practice varies across regions: 
the coefficient for SSDUMMY is positive for all models in the full sample and Latin America, 
and is statistically significant in Latin America sample. For both Europe, Africa, and Middle East
sample and the Asian sample, the impact is negative and statistically significant for some 
models. Since the data on short-selling is very limited, we should not surprise for the mixed 
results. 
V. A. 3. The Impact of Liquidity on Equity Flows
We now turn to the focus of our paper, the relation between liquidity and equity flows in 
emerging markets. 
As a measure of trading frequency, TURNOVER in model (2) has a positive sign in both 
full sample and three regional samples, and its coefficients are statistically significant at 1 
percent level, except in Asia sample. As an illustration, with every 1 percent increase in 
TURNOVER, the equities purchased by the U.S. investors increased about 12.85 percent of a
country’s GDP in Latin America and 3.49 percent in Europe, Africa, and Middle East during 
January 1995 and December 2000. Figure 3 also displays that except South Korea and Taiwan, 
other sample countries maintain a steady TURNOVER ratio across the sample time. Intuitively, a 
higher TURNOVER ratio signals lower transactions costs of the local equity market. That is, U.S. 
investors prefer a more stable, cheaper, and easier market. 
Models (3) and (4) use dollar trading volume as the liquidity measure. TRADVOL_1 is 
the natural logarithm of the value of share traded and TRADVOL_2 is the ratio of the value of 
share traded over a country’s GDP. Our empirical results indicate that the coefficients on 
TRADVOL_1 are positive and statistically significant for all models and in all four samples, 
which is consistent with our hypothesis. The coefficients on TRADVOL_2 are also positive for 
all samples and are statistically significant for all except the Asian sample. A country’s stock 
market with a higher dollar volume of trading indicates an active market, most likely associated 
with lower spreads, and that a high number of investors participate in that market. It might also 
reflect investors’ confidence on that market. If so, the evidence suggests that U.S. investors 
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prefer an active emerging stock market and would purchase foreign equities from a market that 
they have confidence in. 
Models (5), (6), and (7) use price impact to measure liquidity. We calculate 
PRIIMPACT_1, PRIIMPACT_2, and PRIIMPACT_3 based on three different price indexes to 
measure the absolute price change per dollar of monthly trading volume. The coefficients on 
PRIIMPACT_1 and PRIIMPACT_2 are negative for all but the Latin America sample. They are 
statistically significant for both full sample and the Asian sample, as we hypothesize that 
investors desire deeper markets with lower degree of price impacts, or the market with lower 
price change in terms of one dollar of trading volume. The exception is in Latin America sample 
where the coefficients are positive but insignificant. The descriptive statistics28 of
PRIIMPACT_1 and PRIIMPACT_2 across countries indicate that Argentina and Peru have very 
volatile price impact over the sample period. Thus, the individual country characteristics may 
affect the estimation. As for PRIIMPACT_3, its coefficient is negative, which is consistent with 
our expectation, for all four samples, but not statistically significantly. 
As a summary, the overall evidence regarding the effects of liquidity supports our 
hypotheses. The importance of different dimensions of liquidity varies across regions. For 
example in the Asian region, the relation between equity flows and volume-related liquidity is 
weak while that between flows and price impacts of trading is quite strong. This reinforces the 
notion that there are multiple dimensions in liquidity.
                                                
28 Not reported here.
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Table II. The Impacts of Control Variables and Liquidity on U.S. Equity Flows
Table II includes four Panels A – D presenting estimation results for full sample, Latin America sample, Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, 
and Asia sample, respectively. For each panel, seven regression models [1] – [7] are estimated, each with a different measure of liquidity except 
for model [1] which only includes control variables. In regressions [2] to [7], liquidity is measured by TURNOVER, TRADVOL_1, TRADVOL_2, 
PRIIMPACT_1, PRIIMPACT_2, and PRIIMPACT_3, respectively. All regressions are estimated over the period from January 1995 to December 
2002.
The dependent variable, ity , in fixed country effect estimation is the U.S. equity inflow into country i at month t scaled by country i’s GDP: 
itiit
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itkkit LIQUIDXy  
1
,
itkX , denotes the control variables including SIZE, EXCESSRETt-1, ECONFREE, CAPLCONS, EXCHG, and SSDUMMY.   All explanatory 
variables are at month t, except EXCESSRET, the excess return of country equity market of a period t-1. SIZE is market size. ECONFREE is the 
natural logarithm of the index of economic freedom. CAPLCONS is the capital control. EXCHG is the change in exchange rate. SSDUMMY is the 
dummy equal to 1 if shorting-selling is allowed in stock market. 
itLIQUID denotes the alternative liquidity measure: TURNOVER is the ratio of value of share traded over market capitalization; TRADVOL_1 is 
the natural logarithm of the value of share traded; TRADVOL_2 is the value of share traded as a percentage of GDP;  PRIIMPACT_1 is the 
absolute value of the IFCG price change over dollar value traded; PRIIMPACT_2 is the absolute value of the IFCI price change over dollar value 
traded;  PRIIMPACT_3 is the absolute value of local stock market price change over dollar value traded. 
Constants and the country-specific intercepts are included but not reported. Enclosed in parenthesis are the p-values which are computed using 
robust standard errors, allowing for clustering by country. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. The p-values of F-test for country-specific effect, Hausman test for an appropriate estimator (FE or RE), Breusch-Pagan LM test for 
cross-sectional variance = 0, Modified Wald test for Heteroskedasticity, and Wooldridge test for autocorrelation are in bracket.
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Table II. Panel A. Full Sample
U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 1.126*** 1.086*** 0.712*** 0.949*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 1.113***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.133*** -0.149*** -0.153*** -0.144*** -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.133***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ECONFREE 2.400*** 2.610*** 2.182*** 2.623*** 2.671*** 2.668*** 2.383***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPLCONS -1.244*** -1.022*** -1.160*** -1.126*** -1.341*** -1.342*** -1.249***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCHG 0.094 0.119 0.252 0.109 0.264 0.260 0.108
(0.798) (0.747) (0.459) (0.768) (0.525) (0.531) (0.767)
SSDUMMY 0.036 0.054 0.116* 0.029 0.090 0.090 0.037
(0.595) (0.420) (0.090) (0.668) (0.254) (0.253) (0.581)
TURNOVER 2.053***
(0.001)
TRADVOL_1 0.268***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 2.165***
(0.008)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.359**
(0.012)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.358***
(0.009)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.163
(0.161)
Number of Observations. 957 956 957 957 744 744 957
Number of Groups 14 14 14 14 11 11 14
Adj R2 0.5304 0.5363 0.5539 0.5369 0.5018 0.5018 0.5302
Country effects F test that all ui = 0 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Hausman χ2 [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Heteroskedasticity [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wooldridge for Autocorrelation [0.012] [0.035] [0.029] [0.026] [0.000] [0.000] [0.011]
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Table II. Panel B. Latin America
U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 2.246*** 2.265*** 0.795 0.903 2.261*** 2.263*** 2.222***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.206) (0.179) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.114*** -0.108*** -0.113*** -0.107*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.114***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ECONFREE 2.947*** 2.911*** 3.913*** 3.012*** 2.946*** 2.947*** 2.946***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CAPLCONS -2.530** -2.696*** -2.307** -2.464*** -2.521** -2.521** -2.540**
(0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
EXCHG -0.451 -0.402 -0.182 -0.243 -0.453 -0.453 -0.447
(0.430) (0.462) (0.741) (0.644) (0.427) (0.427) (0.436)
SSDUMMY 0.3442** 0.634*** 0.699*** 0.523*** 0.344** 0.344** 0.345**
(0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
TURNOVER 12.845***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_1 0.526***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 53.440***
(0.000)
PRIIMPACT_1 0.024
(0.903)
PRIIMPACT_2 0.025
(0.892)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.046
(0.777)
Number of Observations. 330 329 330 330 330 330 330
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Adj R2 0.3592 0.3945 0.4184 0.4087 0.3572 0.3572 0.3573
Country effects F test that all ui = 0 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Hausman χ2 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Heteroskedasticity [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wooldridge for Autocorrelation [0.026] [0.016] [0.022] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.021]
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Table II. Panel C. Europe, Africa, and Middle East
U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 0.684*** 1.008*** 0.869*** 0.702*** 0.366*** 0.366*** 0.683***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.090) (0.001)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.220 -0.300 -0.395* -0.361* -0.851 -0.851 -0.222
(0.293) (0.195) (0.079) (0.090) (0.288) (0.289) (0.291)
ECONFREE 4.824*** 4.483*** 2.384*** 3.382*** 7.894*** 7.885*** 4.767***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
CAPLCONS 85.744*** 67.386*** 65.938*** 58.522*** 1.021 0.996 86.147***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.961) (0.962) (0.000)
EXCHG 0.835 1.243** 1.124** 1.360** 1.147 1.144 0.857
(0.144) (0.033) (0.043) (0.026) (0.333) (0.334) (0.136)
SSDUMMY -0.230*** -0.051 -0.163** 0.058 Dropped Dropped -0.234***
(0.000) (0.380) (0.017) (0.361) (0.000)
TURNOVER 3.488***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_1 0.213***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 7.967***
(0.000)
PRIIMPACT_1 -3.195
(0.224)
PRIIMPACT_2 -3.182
(0.225)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.067
(0.558)
Number of Observations. 213 213 213 213 71 71 213
Number of Groups 3 3 3 3 1 1 3
Adj R2 0.5856 0.5894 0.5927 0.5822 0.1562 0.1561 0.5837
Country effects F test that all ui = 0 [0.000] [0.000]
Hausman χ2 [0.000] [0.216] [0.292] [0.061] n/a n/a [0.001]
Estimation FE Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE
Heteroskedasticity [0.000]
Breusch-Pagan LM test of variances  = 0 [0.397] [0.375] [0.883]
Wooldridge for Autocorrelation [0.053 [0.060] [0.048] [0.032] n/a n/a [0.050]
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Table II. Panel D. Asia
U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 1.170*** 1.152*** 0.778*** 1.060*** 0.827*** 0.825*** 1.145***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 0.193 0.107 -0.018 0.105 0.019 0.012 0.181
(0.535) (0.734) (0.953) (0.733) (0.955) (0.971) (0.564)
ECONFREE -1.111 -0.873 -0.602 -0.654 0.067 0.055 -1.000
(0.164) (0.271) (0.418) (0.411) (0.899) (0.916) (0.219)
CAPLCONS -1.141*** -1.055*** -1.072*** -1.085*** -0.931*** -0.935*** -1.151***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCHG 0.394 0.381 0.436 0.384 0.564 0.564 0.402
(0.346) (0.364) (0.274) (0.363) (0.222) (0.220) (0.325)
SSDUMMY -0.129* -0.124* -0.053 -0.131* 0.001 0.001 -0.116
(0.092) (0.101) (0.468) (0.081) (0.989) (0.984) (0.132)
TURNOVER 0.845
(0.206)
TRADVOL_1 0.252***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 1.211
(0.146)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.582***
(0.004)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.610***
(0.002)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.325
(0.193)
Number of Observations. 414 414 414 414 343 343 414
Number of Groups 6 6 6 6 5 5 6
Adj R2 0.5759 0.5765 0.5935 0.5790 0.5757 0.5761 0.5753
Country effects F test that all ui = 0 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Hausman χ2 [0.000] [0.001] [0.011] [0.000] n/a n/a [0.000]
Estimation FE FE FE FE RE RE FE
Heteroskedasticity [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Breusch-Pagan LM test of variances  = 0 [0.000] [0.000]
Wooldridge for Autocorrelation [0.326] [0.416] [0.407] [0.408] [0.009] [0.009] [0.325]
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V. A. 4. Does the Past Liquidity Matter?
In this section, we substitute a lagged liquidity for the current one to investigate if 
liquidity in the earlier month has any impact on equity flows after controlling for those macro 
factors mentioned above. Using lagged liquidity may also help to assess the robustness of results 
and to address the potential problem on endogeneity29 for our estimations. 
Because the data on PRIIMPACT_1 and PRIIMPACT_2 is lacking for some countries in 
the Europe, Africa, and Middle East region, here we have to omit these two measures of liquidity 
on equity flows for this region. Recall that previous results we do not observe a significant 
impact of PRIIMPACT_3 on equity flows even though the coefficients of PRIIMPACT_3 have a 
negative sign as we hypothesize. For this reason, PRIIMPACT_3 is not examined in this 
exercise. Table III indicates that with very few exceptions, the coefficients for the past 
TURNOVER, TRADVOL_1, TRADVOL_2, PRIIMPACT_1, and PRIIMPACT_2, as well as the 
coefficients for all control variables are similar to those in Table II. We compare the results in 
the two tables: the magnitude of the coefficients for the past liquidity is lower than that for the 
contemporaneous liquidity. Stated differently, the explanatory power of equity flows by past 
local market liquidity is less pronounced for all models in Table III than that in Table II which 
shows the regressions in contemporaneous variables. Also, the lagged liquidity does not affect 
the other coefficients.
                                                
29 Gelos and Wei (2005) address the problem of endogeneity in several ways. One way is using lagged independent 
variable to estimate their regression.
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Table III. Regressions with Lagged Liquidity
Table III includes four Panels A – D presenting estimation results for full sample, Latin America sample, Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, 
and Asia sample, respectively. Panel A, B, and D include five models [2] – [6] and Panel C only include three models [2] – [4], each with a 
different measure of liquidity. In regressions [2] to [7], liquidity is measured by TURNOVER, TRADVOL_1, TRADVOL_2, PRIIMPACT_1, 
PRIIMPACT_2, and PRIIMPACT_3, respectively. All regressions are estimated over the period from January 1995 to December 2002.
The dependent variable, ity , in fixed country effect estimation is the U.S. equity inflow into country i at month t scaled by country i’s GDP: 
ititi
M
k
itkkit LIQUIDXy  

 1,
1
,
itkX , denotes the control variables including SIZE, EXCESSRETt-1, ECONFREE, CAPLCONS, EXCHG, and SSDUMMY.   All control variables are 
at month t, except EXCESSRET, the excess return of country equity market of a period t-1. SIZE is market size. ECONFREE is the natural 
logarithm of the index of economic freedom. CAPLCONS is the capital control. EXCHG is the change in exchange rate. SSDUMMY is the dummy 
equal to 1 if shorting-selling is allowed in stock market. 
1, tiLIQUID denotes the lagged liquidity. In this table, we analyze five liquidity measures: TURNOVER  is the ratio of value of share traded over 
market capitalization; TRADVOL_1 is the natural logarithm of the value of share traded; TRADVOL_2 is the value of share traded as a percentage 
of GDP; PRIIMPACT_1  is the absolute value of the IFCG price change over dollar value traded; PRIIMPACT_2 is the absolute value of the IFCI 
price change over dollar value traded. All liquidity measures are at month t – 1.
Constants and the country-specific intercepts are included but not reported. Enclosed in parenthesis are the p-values which are computed using 
robust standard errors, allowing for clustering by country. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
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Table III. Panel A. Full Sample Table III. Panel B. Latin America
U.S. Equity Flows U.S. Equity Flows
[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIZE 1.103*** 0.830*** 0.981*** 1.018*** 1.016*** 2.259*** 1.066* 1.249* 2.347*** 2.339***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.103) (0.065) (0.001) (0.001)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.145*** -0.146*** -0.143*** -0.029 -0.030 -0.103*** -0.113*** -0.109*** -0.178 -0.179
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.914) (0.914) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.714) (0.722)
ECONFREE 2.496*** 2.220*** 2.594*** 2.573*** 2.579*** 2.849*** 3.858*** 3.085*** 2.766*** 2.767***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
CAPLCONS -1.091*** -1.165*** -1.131*** -1.319*** -1.322*** -2.616*** -2.130** -2.285** -2.621** -2.625**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.033) (0.028) (0.014) (0.014)
EXCHG 0.073 -0.105 0.030 0.190 0.187 -0.511 -0.868** -0.704 -0.498 -0.502
(0.844) (0.753) (0.936) (0.668) (0.671) (0.360) (0.098) (0.173) (0.485) (0.489)
SSDUMMY 0.049 0.102 0.032 0.073 0.074 0.556*** 0.669*** 0.496*** 0.333** 0.333**
(0.470) (0.137) (0.630) (0.355) (0.336) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.029) (0.025)
TURNOVERt-1 1.386* 9.448***
(0.057) (0.002)
TRADVOL_1t-1 0.205*** 0.466***
(0.000) (0.000)
TRADVOL_2t-1 1.932** 41.574***
(0.022) (0.000)
PRIIMPACT_1t-1 -0.114 0.214
(0.430) (0.368)
PRIIMPACT_2t-1 -0.136 0.199
(0.320) (0.381)
Number of 
Observations.
956 957 957 735 735 329 330 330 326 326
Adj R2 0.5333 0.5446 0.5357 0.4963 0.4964 0.3764 0.4018 0.3872 0.3497 0.3496
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Table III. Panel C. Europe, Africa, and Middle East Table III. Panel D. Asia
U.S. Equity Flows U.S. Equity Flows
[2] [3] [4] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIZE 0.716*** 0.682*** 0.681*** 1.165*** 0.959*** 1.089*** 1.112*** 1.105***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.290 -0.307 -0.311 0.165 0.093 0.119 0.094 0.096
(0.182) (0.132) (0.117) (0.588) (0.768) (0.703) (0.784) (0.774)
ECONFREE 4.783*** 3.572*** 3.892*** -1.031 -0.777 -0.747 -0.579 -0.533
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.209) (0.318) (0.357) (0.512) (0.545)
CAPLCONS 82.045 79.404 71.625 -1.112*** -1.093*** -1.093*** -1.207*** -1.213
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCHG 0.943 0.793 0.796 0.380 0.176 0.333 0.484 0.477
(0.142) (0.212) (0.193) (0.383) (0.654) (0.447) (0.348) (0.353)
SSDUMMY -0.216*** -0.278*** -0.222*** -0.127* -0.079 -0.129* -0.122 -0.118
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.301) (0.083) (0.116) (0.111)
TURNOVERt-1 1.779* 0.284
(0.054) (0.723)
TRADVOL_1t-1 0.113** 0.143**
(0.043) (0.037)
TRADVOL_2t-1 4.982 0.960
(0.122) (0.245)
PRIIMPACT_1t-1 -0.013
(0.954)
PRIIMPACT_2t-1 -0.077
(0.726)
Number of Observations. 213 213 213 414 414 414 339 339
Adj R2 0.5892 0.5906 0.5928 0.575 0.5813 0.5775 0.6061 0.6062
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V. B. A Comparison of Short and Long-Horizon U.S. Equity Flows
Since some of liquidity dimensions, such as trading frequency and trading volume, reflect 
trading activities that might respond to current or past month equity flows, it is possible that 
liquidity is influenced by the current or past equity flows. However, the influence should be less 
in the long term than that in the short term. To control for the potential endogeneity and as 
another robustness check, we estimate both short and long-horizon regressions of U.S. equity 
flows on various explanatory variables. Inspired by Edison and Warnock (2003a)30, we calculate 
the average twelve-month-ahead equity flows to perform a long-horizon regression, and use one-
month-ahead equity flows for a short-horizon regression. We employ fixed-effect estimator with 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors to investigate the impact of various macro factors, 
especially liquidity, on both the average twelve-month and one-month-ahead U.S. equity flows. 
The regression model is as follows: 
mtiit
M
k
itkki
m
j
jti
LIQUIDX
m
y




 

,
1
,
1
,
(2)
where 
o
m
y
m
j
jti


1
,
is the average monthly U.S. equity inflows into country i from month t + 1 to 
month t + m scaled by country i’s GDP; m = 1 and 12.
o As mentioned earlier, overlapping observations induces the serial correlation of 
regression residuals. The OLS standard errors may not account for this fact and will lead 
to biased inference. To correct for serial correlation and conditional heteroskedasticity, 
Newey-West standard errors are used here. 
The time period is from January 1995 through December 2003. The empirical results are 
reported in Table IV. As the table shows, the impacts of various macro factors on average 
twelve-month-ahead U.S. equity inflows into emerging markets are fairly strong. For the full 
sample, the coefficients on all control variables are statistically significant and all have the signs
consistent with our expectation. Regarding the regional samples, there is one result inconsistent 
                                                
30 They estimate long-horizon regression to alleviate endogeneity issues and smooth the very volatile data on net 
purchases. They also use Newey and West standard errors to correct for the error autocorrelation induced by the 
overlapping structure of the long-horizon regressions.
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with our expectation: CAPLCONS in Latin America has a positive but insignificant coefficient, 
which is different from the previous estimation. A similar divergence occurs in CAPLCONS for 
Europe, Africa, and Middle East region, where the coefficient on CAPLCONS is positive and 
statistically significant. For this puzzling result, we offer no satisfactory explanation31. A possible 
explanation is that capital control is intended for ordinary investors while it is not a major 
concern for well-connected institutional investors. The variables SIZE, EXCESSRETt-1, 
ECONFREE, and SSDUMMY are all significant with expected signs in Latin America. Also for 
the Latin American sample, EXCHG is significantly negatively correlated with long-horizon 
equity inflows into Latin America markets with the exception of models (3) and (4). The sign is 
opposite to previous results. In Europe, Africa, and Middle East market, SIZE, ECONFREE, 
CAPLCONS, and SSDUMMY all significantly determine equity inflows. However, the evidence 
on SSDUMMY is mixed. Models (2) and (4) produce a positive and significant sign. In the Asian
sample, while all control variables have the expected signs, only SIZE and CAPLCONS have 
statistically significant relation with long-horizon equity flows. 
With respect to liquidity, the impacts of six liquidity measures on U.S. equity flows are 
consistent with our expectation. The long-horizon effects of TURNOVER and TRADVOL_1 are
positive and significant for all but the Asian sample where the coefficients are insignificant. 
TRADVOL_2 has a positive impact on equity flows with a statistically significant coefficient of 
10.30 and 25.28 for Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample and Latin America sample, 
respectively. The significant and positive relation between TRADVOL_2 and the average twelve-
month-ahead equity flow holds for all regressions except those for the Asian samples. As we 
have noted, TRADVOL_2 measures the effects of trading value as a share of national output. For 
example, a 1 percent increase in the value of share traded in a market of Latin America leads to a 
25.28 percent increase in U.S. equity inflows into that region.  Furthermore, the coefficients for
PRIIMPACT_1 and PRIIMPACT_2 are negative and significant for the full sample, but not 
significant for Latin America and Asia samples. Because of lack of data, we omit the regressions 
on PRIIMPACT_1 and PRIIMPACT_2 for Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample. As 
hypothesized, PRIIMPACT_3 has a negative impact on equity flows for Latin America and 
Europe, Africa, and Middle East samples, even though the coefficient is not significant. For the 
                                                
31 Edison and Warnock (2003a) have the same conclusion on capital controls: a reduction in capital controls results 
in a significant increase in long-horizon equity flows to emerging Asia, but not to Latin America.
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full sample and the Asian sample, the coefficient of RIIMPACT_3 on the long-run equity flows is 
also insignificant but positive. The evidence of liquidity effects in Asia here is relatively weak, 
compared to that in Table II, suggesting that liquidity effects in Asia are relatively short term32. 
Table V reports the empirical results on the impacts of macro factors on one-month-
ahead U.S. equity flows. Most variables are again related to equity flows and the magnitude is 
even more than in the long-horizon regression. An emerging country with larger equity market 
SIZE attracts more U.S. equity inflows, which is highly significant in all cases. The larger the 
country’s ECONFREE, the more equities U.S. investors would purchase from that country. The 
result is significant for all but the Asian sample where the models produce negative and 
insignificant coefficients of ECONFREE as those in Table II. It appears that Asia’s ECONFREE
does not directly influence equity flows in a short-horizon but it does in a long-horizon. With 
some exceptions, the coefficients of EXCESSRETt-1 are negative for all cases and statistically 
significant for the full sample and Latin America. A reduction in CAPLCONS results in equity 
inflows into Latin America and Asia markets. The coefficients of CAPLCONS are significantly 
negative in the full sample, Latin America, and Asia markets; however for the Europe, Africa, 
and Middle East market, we still find the puzzling positive and statistically significant coefficient 
for CAPLCONS. The negative sign in EXCHG is in line with the estimation in Table IV for the 
full sample and Latin America. The coefficient of EXCHG is significantly negative in most 
models for Latin America. However, for Europe, Africa, and Middle East and Asia samples, 
EXCHG positively influences equity inflows, but not significantly in most models. As a 
comparison, EXCHG is significant in the long-horizon regression but not in short-run regression 
for the full sample, suggesting that the effect of the change in exchange rate may take a long time 
to appear. SSDUMMY have significantly positive coefficients in the full sample and Latin 
America. The evidence on SSDUMMY in Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample and Asia 
sample is mixed. 
Regarding the effect of liquidity in one-month-ahead equity flows, the evidence shows 
that the short-horizon effects of TURNOVER and TRADVOL_1 are positive and significant for 
all but Asia sample where the coefficients are insignificant. TRADVOL_2 has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on equity flows for Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample and 
                                                
32 The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998 may affect the results, although many other emerging markets also 
suffer tremendous stress. During a financial crisis foreign equity flows may dry up or behave differently from 
normal times.
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Latin America sample. PRIIMPACT_1 and PRIIMPACT_2 are negative for the full sample and 
Asia sample, but only significant for Asia samples. With regard to Latin America, two price 
impact measures are positively related to immediate and short-horizon equity inflows into Latin 
America (as shown in Panel B of Table II and Table V) but negatively related to long-horizon 
equity inflows (in Panel B of Table IV). It seems that the negative impact of price impact on U.S. 
equity inflows into Latin America takes more than one month to become visible. As for the 
effects of PRIIMPACT_3, there is little evidence that it affects U.S. equity flows. Recall that 
PRIIMPACT_3 reflects more of smalls stocks’ price impacts. If U.S. investors are mostly 
interested in larger stocks, small stocks’ price impacts are of little concern to them, which 
potentially explains the lack of significance for PRIIMPACT_3.
Comparing the coefficient estimates in Table IV and V with those in Table II, it appears
that the effects of control variables last over a year. Specifically, across these three tables, SIZE
has the larger magnitude in the short horizon and in the contemporaneous period than in the long 
horizon. This is true for all cases. Moreover, a comparison of the full sample across the three 
tables shows us that the coefficients for EXCESSRET, ECONFREE, and CAPLCONS are smaller 
in the long-horizon estimation; on the other hand, EXCHG has the largest and significant effect 
on equity flows in the long-horizon regression. More importantly, the impacts of TURNOVER,
TRADVOL_1, and TRADVOL_2 on equity flows are stronger in the contemporaneous period and 
short horizon than in the long horizon for all cases. While the effects of PRIIMPACT_1, 
PRIIMPACT_2, and PRIIMPACT_3 vary across regions, the typical pattern is similar to the other 
liquidity measures.
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Table IV. Estimation of the Average Twelve-Month-Ahead U.S. Equity Flows
Table IV includes four Panels A – D presenting estimation results for full sample, Latin America sample, Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, 
and Asia sample, respectively. For each panel except Panel C where model (5) and (6) are omitted due to the limited availability of the data, seven 
regression models [1] – [7] are estimated, each with a different measure of liquidity except for model [1] which only includes control variables. In 
regressions [2] to [7], liquidity is measured by TURNOVER, TRADVOL_1, TRADVOL_2, PRIIMPACT_1, PRIIMPACT_2, and PRIIMPACT_3, 
respectively. All regressions are estimated over the period from January 1995 to December 2002.
The dependent variable, 
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, in fixed country effect estimation is the average twelve-month ahead U.S. equity inflows into country i at 
month t scaled by country i’s GDP: 
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Xk,it denotes the control variables including SIZE, EXCESSRETt-1, ECONFREE, CAPLCONS, EXCHG, and SSDUMMY.   All explanatory variables 
are at month t, except EXCESSRET, the excess return of country equity market of a period t-1. SIZE is market size. ECONFREE is the natural 
logarithm of the index of economic freedom. CAPLCONS is the capital control. EXCHG is the change in exchange rate. SSDUMMY is the dummy 
equal to 1 if shorting-selling is allowed in stock market. 
LIQUIDit denotes the alternative liquidity measure: TURNOVER is the ratio of value of share traded over market capitalization; TRADVOL_1 is 
the natural logarithm of the value of share traded; TRADVOL_2 is the value of share traded as a percentage of GDP;  PRIIMPACT_1 is the 
absolute value of the IFCG price change over dollar value traded; PRIIMPACT_2 is the absolute value of the IFCI price change over dollar value 
traded;  PRIIMPACT_3 is the absolute value of local stock market price change over dollar value traded. 
Constants and the country-specific intercepts are included but not reported. Enclosed in parenthesis are the p-values which are computed using 
Newey-West standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table IV. Panel A. Full Sample
Average 12-month-ahead U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 1.014*** 0.984*** 0.864*** 0.929*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 1.021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.088** -0.099*** -0.095*** -0.093*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.088**
(0.013) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
ECONFREE 2.389*** 2.545*** 2.310*** 2.496*** 2.968*** 2.966*** 2.399***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPLCONS -0.972*** -0.806*** -0.942*** -0.915*** -0.631*** -0.631*** -0.969***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCHG -0.404** -0.386** -0.347* -0.397** -0.291* -0.294* -0.412**
(0.0250 (0.030) (0.058) (0.027) (0.104) (0.092) (0.022)
SSDUMMY 0.090** 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.087** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.090**
(0.013) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
TURNOVER 1.532**
(0.014)
TRADVOL_1 0.097***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 1.036
(0.167)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.119*
(0.081)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.115*
(0.062)
PRIIMPACT_3 0.088
(0.213)
Number of Observations 957 956 957 957 744 744 957
Adj R2 0.7091 0.7139 0.7132 0.7110 0.6907 0.6907 0.7089
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Table IV. Panel B. Latin America
Average 12-month-ahead U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 1.052*** 1.057*** 0.375 0.417 1.023*** 1.024*** 1.031***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.258) (0.191) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.109*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.113***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ECONFREE 4.228*** 4.240*** 4.679*** 4.258*** 4.228*** 4.228*** 4.227***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPLCONS 0.154 0.157 0.258 0.185 0.139 0.139 0.145
(0.844) (0.843) (0.741) (0.805) (0.860) (0.867) (0.855)
EXCHG -0.521* -0.501* -0.395 -0.422 -0.517* -0.517* -0.516*
(0.078) (0.088) (0.165) (0.164) (0.089) (0.081) (0.096)
SSDUMMY 0.243*** 0.405*** 0.408*** 0.327*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.243***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TURNOVER 7.274***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_1 0.245***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 25.282***
(0.000)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.044
(0.609)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.043
(0.612)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.042
(0.600)
Number of Observations 330 329 330 330 330 330 330
Adj R2 0.6065 0.6291 0.6292 0.6259 0.6054 0.6054 0.6054
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Table IV. Panel C. Europe, Africa, and Middle East
Average 12-month-ahead U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [7]
SIZE 0.563*** 0.852*** 0.735*** 0.520*** 0.563***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 0.026 -0.006 -0.186 -0.143 0.025
(0.883) (0.977) (0.310) (0.446) (0.889)
ECONFREE 3.250*** 2.930*** 0.155 1.433*** 3.230***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.758) (0.001) (0.000)
CAPLCONS 75.805*** 58.364*** 52.147*** 42.507*** 75.940***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCHG -0.232 0.587 0.216 0.518 -0.224
(0.603) (0.332) (0.627) (0.358) (0.630)
SSDUMMY -0.184*** 0.184** -0.073 0.211*** -0.186***
(0.000) (0.045) (0.274) (0.000) (0.001)
TURNOVER 2.663***
(0.009)
TRADVOL_1 0.274***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 10.298***
(0.000)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.023
(0.727)
Number of Observations 213 213 213 213 213
Adj R2 0.6932 0.6256 0.6822 0.6599 0.6917
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Table IV. Panel D. Asia
Average 12-month-ahead U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 1.076*** 1.056*** 0.992*** 1.062*** 0.821*** 0.822*** 1.091***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 0.124 0.033 0.079 0.113 -0.074 -0.074 0.132
(0.526) (0.870) (0.668) (0.554) (0.795) (0.794) (0.497)
ECONFREE 0.623 0.874 0.731 0.680 0.628 0.623 0.554
(0.306) (0.121) (0.222) (0.252) (0.181) (0.183) (0.3740
CAPLCONS -0.937*** -0.846*** -0.923*** -0.930*** -0.347*** -0.345*** -0.931***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
EXCHG -0.289 -0.303 -0.280 -0.290 -0.266 -0.272 -0.294
(0.132) (0.139) (0.141) (0.118) (0.185) (0.173) (0.151)
SSDUMMY 0.021 0.026 0.037 0.021 -0.039 -0.040 0.013
(0.622) (0.532) (0.387) (0.620) (0.348) (0.342) (0.755)
TURNOVER 0.893
(0.209)
TRADVOL_1 0.054
(0.123)
TRADVOL_2 0.151
(0.840)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.208
(0.193)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.200
(0.215)
PRIIMPACT_3 0.201
(0.334)
Number of Observations 414 414 414 414 343 343 414
Adj R2 0.7138 0.7156 0.7142 0.7132 0.6286 0.6285 0.7133
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Table V. Estimation of the One-Month-Ahead U.S. Equity Flows
Table V includes four Panels A – D presenting estimation results for full sample, Latin America sample, Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample, 
and Asia sample, respectively. For each panel except Panel C where model (5) and (6) are omitted due to the limited availability of the data, seven 
regression models [1] – [7] are estimated, each with a different measure of liquidity except for model [1] which only includes control variables. In 
regressions [2] to [7], liquidity is measured by TURNOVER, TRADVOL_1, TRADVOL_2, PRIIMPACT_1, PRIIMPACT_2, and PRIIMPACT_3, 
respectively. All regressions are estimated over the period from January 1995 to December 2002.
The dependent variable, 
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Xk,it denotes the control variables including SIZE, EXCESSRETt-1, ECONFREE, CAPLCONS, EXCHG, and SSDUMMY.   All explanatory variables 
are at month t, except EXCESSRET, the excess return of country equity market of a period t-1. SIZE is market size. ECONFREE is the natural 
logarithm of the index of economic freedom. CAPLCONS is the capital control. EXCHG is the change in exchange rate. SSDUMMY is the dummy 
equal to 1 if shorting-selling is allowed in stock market. 
LIQUIDit denotes the alternative liquidity measure: TURNOVER is the ratio of value of share traded over market capitalization; TRADVOL_1 is 
the natural logarithm of the value of share traded; TRADVOL_2 is the value of share traded as a percentage of GDP;  PRIIMPACT_1 is the 
absolute value of the IFCG price change over dollar value traded; PRIIMPACT_2 is the absolute value of the IFCI price change over dollar value 
traded;  PRIIMPACT_3 is the absolute value of local stock market price change over dollar value traded. 
Constants and the country-specific intercepts are included but not reported. Enclosed in parenthesis are the p-values which are computed using 
Newey-West standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table V. Panel A. Full Sample
One-month-ahead U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 1.152*** 1.128*** 0.873*** 1.048*** 1.059*** 1.056*** 1.155***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.132*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.126***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ECONFREE 2.467*** 2.576*** 2.319*** 2.599*** 2.803*** 2.807*** 2.470***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPLCONS -1.208*** -1.070*** -1.151*** -1.138*** -1.196*** -1.198*** -1.207***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCHG -0.142 -0.128 -0.036 -0.134 -0.080 -0.075 -0.145
(0.684) (0.705) (0.911) (0.698) (0.839) (0.849) (0.667)
SSDUMMY 0.110 0.121* 0.164** 0.105 0.168** 0.169** 0.109
(0.107) (0.076) (0.019) (0.118) (0.031) (0.029) (0.113)
TURNOVER 1.243*
(0.088)
TRADVOL_1 0.181***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 1.278
(0.132)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.091
(0.552)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.109
(0.465)
PRIIMPACT_3 0.033
(0.790)
Number of Observations 957 956 957 957 744 744 957
Adj R2 0.5346 0.5372 0.5449 0.5365 0.5062 0.5063 0.5341
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Table V. Panel B. Latin America
One-month-ahead U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 1.971*** 1.979*** 0.686 0.855 2.130*** 2.119*** 1.996***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.284) (0.216) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.099*** -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.093*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.099***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ECONFREE 3.446*** 3.456*** 4.302*** 3.500*** 3.442*** 3.444*** 3.447***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPLCONS -2.023* -2.037* -1.826* -1.968** -1.939* -1.943* -2.011*
(0.070) (0.059) (0.076) (0.048) (0.085) (0.093) (0.075)
EXCHG -1.236* -1.209* -0.997 -1.063* -1.255** -1.252* -1.241*
(0.062) (0.053) (0.121) (0.086) (0.047) (0.051) (0.060)
SSDUMMY 0.371** 0.588*** 0.685*** 0.520*** 0.369** 0.369** 0.371**
(0.012) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
TURNOVER 9.730***
(0.002)
TRADVOL_1 0.465***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 44.392***
(0.000)
PRIIMPACT_1 0.241
(0.287)
PRIIMPACT_2 0.221
(0.317)
PRIIMPACT_3 0.050
(0.763)
Number of Observations 330 329 330 330 330 330 330
Adj R2 0.3597 0.3796 0.4059 0.3934 0.3590 0.3589 0.3578
44
Table V. Panel C. Europe, Africa, and Middle East
One-month-ahead U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [7]
SIZE 0.785*** 1.042*** 0.918*** 0.748*** 0.785***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.275 -0.332 -0.441* -0.410 -0.275
(0.291) (0.184) (0.086) (0.128) (0.290)
ECONFREE 4.462*** 4.177*** 2.065*** 3.038*** 4.433***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPLCONS 87.869*** 72.145*** 69.674*** 61.962*** 88.075***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCHG 1.035 1.524 1.353 1.583* 1.046
(0.296) (0.118) (0.158) (0.086) (0.288)
SSDUMMY -0.199*** 0.012 -0.126* 0.093 -0.201***
(0.000) (0.860) (0.060) (0.160) (0.000)
TURNOVER 3.050***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_1 0.212***
(0.000)
TRADVOL_2 8.095***
(0.001)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.034
(0.728)
Number of Observations 213 213 213 213 213
Adj R2 0.5908 0.5876 0.5988 0.5895 0.5888
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Table V. Panel D. Asia
One-month-ahead U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
SIZE 1.201*** 1.196*** 1.038*** 1.171*** 0.858*** 0.856*** 1.213***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 -0.057 -0.077 -0.144 -0.080 -0.188 -0.195 -0.051
(0.865) (0.827) (0.692) (0.819) (0.585) (0.572) (0.886)
ECONFREE -0.745 -0.690 -0.534 -0.623 0.049 0.043 -0.799
(0.380) (0.398) (0.488) (0.451) (0.931) (0.940) (0.362)
CAPLCONS -1.108*** -1.088*** -1.080*** -1.093*** -0.804*** -0.810*** -1.103***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCHG 0.161 0.158 0.178 0.158 0.190 0.197 0.157
(0.615) (0.642) (0.606) (0.660) (0.570) (0.556) (0.675)
SSDUMMY -0.010 -0.009 0.022 -0.010 0.050 0.051 -0.016
(0.899) (0.908) (0.783) (0.893) (0.404) (0.394) (0.829)
TURNOVER 0.197
(0.831)
TRADVOL_1 0.105
(0.110)
TRADVOL_2 0.324
(0.722)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.360
(0.105)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.403*
(0.064)
PRIIMPACT_3 0.159
(0.698)
Number of Observations 414 414 414 414 343 343 414
Adj R2 0.5747 0.5737 0.5768 0.5739 0.5670 0.5674 0.5738
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V. C. Dynamic Specifications
In this section, we use a dynamic framework as an alternative approach to estimate the 
impact of macro factors, especially liquidity, on U.S. equity inflows into emerging markets. The 
dynamic specification is of the following type:
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, denotes the lagged U.S. equity flows of country i at time t;  s ≥ 1; S is the number of 
lags; ϕs is the coefficients of stiy ,
We assume that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variables, ϕs, is constant across 
countries, and stiy , is uncorrelated with the error term it . There are three reasons for us to 
employ a dynamic model of equation (3), given below.
First, including lagged dependent variables as a proxy in the static model may help us 
controlling for unobserved or omitted variables which is suspected to be correlated with liquidity 
or any other explanatory variables. We expect that the sign of ϕ is positive if the U.S. equity 
flows have inertia (if the U.S. investors take the earlier month equity flows into consideration 
when they make decision on current month equity allocation). 
Second, a dynamic model33 with lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the 
equation may eliminate the serial correlation of the errors, because the lagged dependent variable 
implicitly includes lagged error terms into the specification. As discussed earlier, the 
autocorrelation test shows some serial correlations34 exist in some models. 
Third, equity flow in our sample is a monthly time series with a trend. The presence of a 
unit root is possible. The latter may affect our inference about the coefficients of liquidity by 
running a spurious regression. We conduct ADF unit root test with time trend and one or more 
                                                
33 According to Arellano and Bond (1991), we first test for the dynamic relationship by conducting the following 
test: run the FE model and get the residuals; construct the lagged residuals, and add into the original FE model 
specification; obtain the estimates and test whether the coefficient on lagged residuals is significant. The F-test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the lagged residuals have no significant effect. The test suggests that the inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variable is justified.
34 We re-test for the autocorrelation for the models with lagged equity flows and find no autocorrelation presents.
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lags, as well as KPSS35 stationary tests, for the U.S. equity flows. The results suggest that 
stationarity of equity flows and their lag lengths vary across countries. Performing a first-
difference36 regression model would help render data stationary, ensure reliable inferences, and 
eliminate the time-invariant fixed effects, i
Given the above-mentioned reasons, we use two approaches to address the issue in this 
section. One is LSDV model37 or fixed-effect model with lagged dependent variables. For this 
estimation, we include up to three lags of the levels of equity flows and compute Newey-West 
standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation corrections up to three lags.
Further lags have been tested and found to be insignificant. As a comparison, we also perform a 
Fixed Effects Two-Stage Least-Squares (FE-2SLS) estimator with three lags of equity flows. We 
use 6,5,4, and,,  tititi yyy as instrumental variables in 2SLS estimation. The results are reported in 
Panel A and B of Table VI, where we only run the regressions for the full sample.
Table VI reports the results for the dynamic specification by the two methods. When we 
include the lagged equity flows, all control variables and liquidity measures continue to have the 
coefficients with the similar magnitude and consistent signs as those in Table II. There are some 
differences compared to the previous results, as follows. The coefficients of EXCESSRET are 
now positive but insignificant and the coefficients on EXCHG are not significant. Also, the 2SLS 
estimation does not indicate significant coefficients for PRIIMPACT_1 and PRIIMPACT_2; on 
the other hand, the estimation of LSDV with lagged dependent variables shows the significant 
impacts of TURNOVER, TRADVOL_1, TRADVOL_2, PRIIMPACT_, and PRIIMPACT_2 on the 
U.S. equity flows, which is consistent with the previous result. It again indicates that emerging
stock market liquidity measured by trading frequency, trading volume, and price impact is an 
important determinant of U.S. equity inflows, after controlling for the historical equity flows. In 
addition, the coefficients on the lagged equity flows are positive as expected, which implies that 
                                                
35 Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS, 1992) test is for stationarity of a time series. Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test takes nonstationarity as the null hypothesis. For both test results we do not report here. 
36 The OLS estimation would still be inefficient because ( 1,  tiit ) is correlated with ( 2,1,   titi yy ) on the 
right hand side of the first-difference equation because 1, tiy is correlated with 1,  ti . 
37 Arellano and Bond (1991)-GMM uses lagged first differences of the variables for the equation in level as 
instruments to control for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variables. In the empirical literature, while AB-
GMM estimator is the standard procedure dealing with such issue, it is designed for small-T large-N panels. 
Especially, it leads to a very large number of instruments for the TSCS data as ours. 
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the U.S. equity flows have inertia. That is, an increased equity flows in a specific month usually 
is followed by another month of increased equity flows.
The similar results from the two estimations suggest the following: that there is little 
endogeneity issue or that the instrumental variables do not carry additional information. For the 
2SLS estimation, we also use a larger number of lagged instrumental variables not reported here, 
but the results do not change qualitatively.
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Table VI. Estimation of a Dynamic Specification
Table VI includes two Panels A and B presenting estimation results of two approaches, LSDV and FE 2SLS, for full sample, respectively. For 
each panel, seven regression models [1] – [7] are estimated, each with a different measure of liquidity except for model [1] which only includes 
control variables. In regressions [2] to [7], liquidity is measured by TURNOVER, TRADVOL_1, TRADVOL_2, PRIIMPACT_1, PRIIMPACT_2, 
and PRIIMPACT_3, respectively. All regressions are estimated over the period from January 1995 to December 2002.
The dependent variable, ity , in dynamic estimation is the U.S. equity inflows into country i at month t scaled by country i’s GDP: 
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stiy , denotes the lagged equity flows. Here three lags of the levels of equity flows are included. The 2SLS estimation uses 6,5,4, and,,  tititi yyy
as instrumental variables. 
Xk,it denotes the control variables including SIZE, EXCESSRETt-1, ECONFREE, CAPLCONS, EXCHG, and SSDUMMY.   All explanatory variables 
are at month t, except EXCESSRET, the excess return of country equity market of a period t-1. SIZE is market size. ECONFREE is the natural 
logarithm of the index of economic freedom. CAPLCONS is the capital control. EXCHG is the change in exchange rate. SSDUMMY is the dummy 
equal to 1 if shorting-selling is allowed in stock market. 
LIQUIDit denotes the alternative liquidity measure: TURNOVER is the ratio of value of share traded over market capitalization; TRADVOL_1 is 
the natural logarithm of the value of share traded; TRADVOL_2 is the value of share traded as a percentage of GDP;  PRIIMPACT_1 is the 
absolute value of the IFCG price change over dollar value traded; PRIIMPACT_2 is the absolute value of the IFCI price change over dollar value 
traded;  PRIIMPACT_3 is the absolute value of local stock market price change over dollar value traded. 
Constants and the country-specific intercepts are included but not reported. Enclosed in parenthesis are the p-values which are computed using 
Newey-West standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation corrections up to three lags. Statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table VI. Panel A. Full Sample - LSDV estimation
U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
EQUITYFLOWSt-1 0.377*** 0.374*** 0.361*** 0.374*** 0.418*** 0.418*** 0.377***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EQUITYFLOWSt-2 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.156*** 0.166*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.166***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
EQUITYFLOWSt-3 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.045 0.056 0.056 0.047
(0.186) (0.209) (0.170) (0.205) (0.144) (0.131) (0.168)
SIZE 0.607*** 0.580*** 0.349*** 0.482*** 0.517*** 0.515*** 0.594***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 0.240 0.149 0.101 0.176 0.228 0.227 0.241
(0.168) (0.392) (0.516) (0.280) (0.334) (0.306) (0.157)
ECONFREE 0.902** 1.092*** 0.868** 1.081*** 0.981** 0.982** 0.890**
(0.018) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.035) (0.036) (0.023)
CAPLCONS -0.462*** -0.297*** -0.442*** -0.384*** -0.508*** -0.509*** -0.467***
(0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
EXCHG -0.253 -0.253 -0.167 -0.255 -0.177 -0.176 -0.240
(0.391) (0.363) (0.551) (0.356) (0.595) (0.582) (0.412)
SSDUMMY 0.020 0.035 0.077 0.015 0.046 0.046 0.021
(0.745) (0.559) (0.178) (0.796) (0.528) (0.508) (0.725)
TURNOVER 1.628***
(0.002)
TRADINGVOL_1 0.183***
(0.000)
TRADINGVOL_2 1.592***
(0.006)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.233**
(0.049)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.244**
(0.026)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.152
(0.153)
Number of Observation 933 932 933 933 726 726 933
Adj.  R2 0.6570 0.6604 0.6674 0.6605 0.6483 0.6484 0.657
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Table VI. Panel B. Full Sample - FE 2SLS estimation
U.S. Equity Flows
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
EQUITYFLOWSt-1 0.372*** 0.368*** 0.353*** 0.368*** 0.413*** 0.413*** 0.371***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EQUITYFLOWSt-2 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.165*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.163***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
EQUITYFLOWSt-3 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.058 0.058 0.049
(0.141) (0.148) (0.137) (0.149) (0.116) (0.116) (0.135)
SIZE 0.588*** 0.558*** 0.312*** 0.457*** 0.495*** 0.494*** 0.571***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EXCESSRET t-1 0.270 0.182 0.119 0.204 0.262 0.261 0.273
(0.136) (0.317) (0.510) (0.260) (0.286) (0.287) (0.131)
ECONFREE 0.902** 1.076** 0.889** 1.079** 0.957** 0.958** 0.909**
(0.038) (0.014) (0.038) (0.013) (0.050) (0.050) 0.037)
CAPLCONS -0.458*** -0.292** -0.447*** -0.381*** -0.504*** -0.505*** -0.465***
(0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
EXCHG -0.283 -0.279 -0.177 -0.281 -0.198 -0.198 -0.264
(0.386) (0.389) (0.581) (0.386) (0.587) (0.587) (0.419)
SSDUMMY 0.026 0.041 0.087 0.023 0.054 0.054 0.029
(0.637) (0.460) (0.122) (0.687) (0.377) (0.373) (0.607)
TURNOVER 1.730***
(0.001)
TRADINGVOL_1 0.196***
(0.000)
TRADINGVOL_2 1.661***
(0.001)
PRIIMPACT_1 -0.234
(0.178)
PRIIMPACT_2 -0.245
(0.151)
PRIIMPACT_3 -0.202
(0.250)
Number of Observation 897 896 897 897 699 699 897
Adj.  R2 0.473 0.478 0.4917 0.4795 0.4918 0.492 0.4738
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VI. Conclusion and Contributions 
We utilize a time series-cross sectional data framework to examine the impacts of various 
macro factors, especially liquidity, on U.S. equity inflows into emerging markets. Since liquidity 
has many dimensions, an emphasis is placed on employing various measures of liquidity. To 
investigate this issue, we perform both static and dynamic analyses, as well as short and long-
horizon regressions. Our study contributes by including a more comprehensive set of macro 
factors and by examining the role of liquidity in greater details. 
We find the importance of macro factors such as market size, past excess return of local 
stock market, country economic freedom, capital control, the change of exchange rate, and 
trading restriction in determining U.S. equity inflows into emerging markets. Empirical evidence 
indicates that emerging country’s equity market size is a highly significant and most important 
determinant of U.S. equity inflows. To the extent that market size proxies for liquidity, this 
supports liquidity as an important concern to investors. Capital control and country’s economic 
freedom appear in most cases to be significant and their coefficients are negative and positive, 
respectively. A few exceptions where we have positive signs for Capital control are the 
regressions for Europe, Africa, and Middle East sample.  Some puzzling results on the effects of 
economic freedom are present in Asia sample. The past local market excess return has a negative 
effect on equity inflows, suggesting a contrarian strategy by some investors. 
The evidence regarding liquidity in general supports our hypotheses that liquidity attracts 
equity flows. The effect of trading frequency measured by turnover on U.S. equity flows is 
positive and consistent across regions. The significant and direct relation between dollar trading 
volume and equity flows implies that U.S. investors prefer to purchase more equities in more 
liquid and active emerging markets, with a varying magnitude of the effect across regions. For 
example in the Asian region, the relation between equity flows and volume-related liquidity is 
weak while that between flows and price impacts of trading is quite strong. This reinforces the 
notion that there are multiple dimensions in liquidity.
Lagged liquidity also has significant impact on equity flows, but the coefficients for 
lagged liquidity are smaller than those for contemporaneous liquidity. Evidence on price impact 
also largely supports our hypothesis: larger price pressure per dollar of trading leads to less 
purchase of foreign equities by U.S. investors. With some exceptions, the relation is statistically 
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significant. Moreover, after controlling for the lagged equity flows, the coefficients on most 
liquidity measures continue to be statistically significant with the sign as expected. 
Summing up, the evidence indicates, though not overwhelmingly, U.S. equity flows tend 
to be greater for larger, deeper, and active emerging markets, for markets where total value 
traded and trading frequency are greater, and for markets where price impact is lower. The 
results from the coefficient estimation of liquidity point to the importance of liquidity 
measurements, arguably more so for emerging markets where the level of liquidity is generally 
low.
Another issue is addressed by this research is if the impacts of the macro factors, 
especially liquidity, on U.S. equity flows differs across time horizons. The long-horizon result is 
most clear: all explanatory variables used in this study play a significant role in explaining the 
U.S. long-horizon equity inflows into sample emerging markets. Short-term (one-month) effects 
of some explanatory variables in equity flows persist over the long horizon, though the 
magnitude of the effects is less the longer the time horizon. The evidence is statistically 
significant for the full sample and Latin American but not the other two regions. 
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Figure 1
Monthly Foreign Equities (millions of USD) Purchased by U.S. Investors
(Jan. 1995 – Dec. 2002)
Graphs by Country
Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.
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Figure 2
Monthly Foreign Equities (millions of USD) Purchased by U.S. Investors 
Jan. 1995 – Dec. 2002
Graphs by Region
Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.
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Figure 3
Monthly Foreign Market Turnover (Jan. 1995 – Dec. 2002)
Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.  And see the text for details.  
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Figure 4
Monthly Foreign Market Trading Volume (Jan. 1995 – Dec. 2002)
Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.  And see the text for details.  
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Figure 5
Monthly Foreign Market Price Impact (Jan. 1995 – Dec. 2002)
Sources: Data sources are reported in Table A1 of Appendix.  And see the text for details.  
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Appendix
Table AI. Data Sources
                                                
38 The ten components of economic freedom are: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government 
Size, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from Corruption, and 
Labor Freedom. Some factors are based on historical information. 
Variable Data Description Data Source
U.S. Equity Flows 
Gross purchases of foreign 
stocks from foreign country 
by the U.S. investors
Department of the Treasury – the U.S. 
Treasury International Capital TIC Reporting 
System        
Market Size Market Capitalization World Federation of Exchanges
Stock Market Return
Emerging country stock 
market price index 
World Federation of Exchanges
U.S. Market Return
Value-weighted return on 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ
WRDS Database
GDP Gross Domestic Product International Monetary Fund
Economic Freedom38
Index of Economic Freedom 
World Rankings
The Heritage Foundation website and The 
Wall Street Journal
Capital Control 
The intensity of capital 
controls or changes in foreign 
ownership restriction
Edison and Warnock (2003b)
Exchange Rate
Country’s exchange rate 
relative to the U.S. dollar
World Federation of Exchanges
Short-selling restriction 
Whether short selling is 
practiced in emerging 
markets: a dummy = 1 if 
short-selling is practiced, 0 
otherwise
Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007)                                   
The original resource is the International 
Securities Services Association Handbook
Market Turnover 
The ratio of the value of 
shares traded to the value of 
shares outstanding
World Federation of Exchanges
Trading Volume Value of share traded World Federation of Exchanges
IFCG Price Index
International Finance 
Corporation’s Global Price 
Index
Standard & Poor’s
IFCI Price Index
International Finance 
Corporation’s Investable 
Price Index
Standard & Poor’s
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Appendix 
Table AII. Local Stock Markets of Fifteen Emerging Countries 
Country Exchange 
Latin America
Argentina Buenos Aires SE
Peru Lima SE
Mexico Mexican Exchange
Chile Santiago SE
Brazil Sao Paulo SE and Rio de Janeiro
Europe, Africa, Middle East
Turkey Istanbul SE
South Africa Johannesburg  - JSE
Israel Tel Aviv SE
Poland Warsaw SE
Asia 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur and Bursa Malaysia
Indonesia Jakarta and Indonesai SE
Korea South Korea Exchange 
Philippines Philippine SE
Taiwan Taiwan SE Corp
Thailand Thailand SE
Sources: World Federation of Exchange
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Chapter Three: 
Liquidity Risk Premium Puzzle and Possible Explanations
I. Introduction
The literature on liquidity indicates that liquidity and its volatility play an important role 
in trading and asset pricing.  This study concentrates on one surprising and puzzling empirical 
finding by Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001b) that indicates a significantly 
negative relation between return and volatility of trading activity, where trading activity is 
measured by both dollar trading volume and share turnover. If the volatility of trading activity is 
a suitable measure of liquidity risk, their finding contradicts the risk-return tradeoff principle. 
Hereinafter, we will refer to their finding as ‘negative liquidity risk premium’ or ‘liquidity risk 
puzzle’. In this study, we attempt to resolve the puzzle by testing the return and liquidity risk 
relation using alternative liquidity measures and by incorporating potential factors that might 
affect the relation into the analysis.  
Liquidity typically refers to the ease of buying and selling at the fair price. This definition 
is evidently imprecise and recent studies suggest that there are several dimension of liquidity. 
The first part of our analysis concentrates on the measurement problem. Because liquidity has 
many dimensions, it is plausible that Chordia et al. (2001b)’s finding is the result of using an 
inappropriate proxy for liquidity risk. Indeed, Johnson (2008) argues that volume represents 
liquidity risk, rather than the level of liquidity. Therefore, it is potentially useful to use 
alternative liquidity measures. 
Moreover, liquidity risk premium varies over time and their study does not control for 
that. Using arguments of market imperfections and behavioral finance, it is potentially useful to 
compare the liquidity risk premium under normal conditions and under extreme down markets. 
As an example, it is plausible that during extreme down markets, investors might act erratically 
and pursue risky trades in the hope of turning a loss into a gain (Prospect Theory). If so, 
empirically we would not be surprised to simultaneously observe low returns and high liquidity 
volatility. To further test whether the puzzle exists only in limited circumstances, we analyze the 
role of firm size and investor sentiment in the relation between returns and liquidity risk. 
Arguably, small stocks and stocks subject to greater sentiment are more vulnerable to liquidity 
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risk and/or panic selling. If so, the relation between return and liquidity volatility is likely to be 
stronger and positive for these stocks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the most related 
research and their implications. Section III describes the methodology and data. Empirical results 
using alternative liquidity measures are discussed in Section IV. We find that with the use of 
alternative liquidity measures, a negative liquidity risk premium is no longer evident, but the 
results vary across time periods and are not conclusive. Consequently, in Section V we explore 
potential factors that might influence the return-liquidity risk relationship, including market 
conditions, firm size effect, and investor sentiments. Our concluding remarks are given in 
Section VI. 
II. Related Literature
While our focus is on the volatility of liquidity, for the sake of completeness we begin 
with a review of studies that examine the relation between return and liquidity; this is followed 
by surveying the literature on liquidity volatility and a discussion of alternative measurements of 
liquidity; finally, several factors that might explain the liquidity risk puzzle are presented.   
II. A. Liquidity and Return
The seminal paper by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that bid-ask spreads and 
returns are positively related. This is sensible in that the bid-ask spread represents a transaction 
cost, thus investors demand higher return as a compensation for the cost. Brennan, Chordia, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) document a negative relation between average returns and dollar trading
volume, with the latter being used as a proxy for liquidity. According to Amihud (2002), 
liquidity also predicts future returns and liquidity shocks are positively correlated with return 
shocks.
More recent empirical work indicates a systematic, market-wide component of liquidity 
(Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Huberman and Halka (2001)). Securities whose 
returns positively correlated with market liquidity should have high expected returns (Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006)). Moreover, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001a) 
show that recent market volatility results in a decrease in trading activity and spreads. There are 
strong day- of-the-week effects; Fridays accompany a significant decrease in trading activity and 
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liquidity, while Tuesdays display the opposite pattern. Long- and short-term interest rates 
influence liquidity. Trading activity increases just prior to major macroeconomic 
announcements.
Further, Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2007) find that negative lagged market return 
worsens stock liquidity, after controlling for the firm specific factors and market volatility 
effects. The theoretical modes in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pederson 
(2007) suggest that the reduction in liquidity following a down market would be dominant in 
high volatility stocks.
II. B. Volatility of Liquidity
The previous section concentrates the level of liquidity; here we focus on papers that 
examine the volatility of liquidity (second moment). Surprisingly, a well-known study by 
Chordia et al. (2001b) provides evidence on a negative, economically significant, and strong      
relation between average returns and the variability of trading activity--measured by both dollar 
trading volume and share turnover, after controlling for the well-known size, book-to-market 
ratio, and momentum effects, as well as the price level and dividend yield. This finding of a 
negative liquidity risk premium is contrary to the principle of risk-return tradeoff. 
Interestingly, a recent study by Johnson (2008) theoretically argues that volume is 
positively related to the variance of liquidity or liquidity risk. Stated differently, volume 
represents liquidity risk, rather than the level of liquidity. The intuition is that trading in any 
typical day comes from a small subset of the investor population, thus volume does not 
adequately capture the level of liquidity. He performs some test of his theory using Government 
bond data as well as the stock market data. He finds some empirical evidence supportive of his 
theoretical prediction. That is, he finds that volume39 is a good measure of liquidity risk and that 
volume is not correlated with proxies for liquidity level. If his theory is true, it implies that 
Chordia et al. (2001b)’s puzzling finding may be due to the usage of an inappropriate measure of 
liquidity risk. 
                                                
39 In constructing empirical proxies for market volume, Johnson (2008) points out that since both expected volume 
and the total quantity of securities are not constant, and volume is not i.i.d, he scales volume by supply to obtain his 
independent variable, turnover, in the model. 
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Chordia et al. (2001a)40 document that daily changes in market averages of liquidity and 
trading activity are highly volatile and negatively serially dependent. They also find that liquidity 
plummets in down markets. Watanabe and Watanabe (2007) develop a dynamic theoretical 
model in which investors are not equally informed about others’ liquidity preference. They use 
trading volume as proxy for the uncertainty about investors’ liquidity preference. Extreme high 
volume indicates that the market is transforming from a low-liquidity-beta period to a high-
liquidity-beta period. Empirically, they find evidence that high-liquidity-beta occurs rather 
infrequently and is characterized by high volatility. They further point out that liquidity risk is 
priced because illiquidity shocks make investor consumptions volatile and risk-averse investors 
dislike volatile consumptions; the more volatile their consumptions become, the more risk 
premium they will require. These studies justify the need to carefully examine extreme down 
markets. 
Moreover, we argue that even in extreme down markets, there will be a minimum level of 
liquidity trading or a ‘floor’ of liquidity. The existence of a minimum level of liquidity trading 
implies that the value of liquidity should behave like that of option. As such, the higher the 
volatility of liquidity, the higher the value of option.  This argument plus above-mentioned 
studies justify the potential usefulness to compare down and up markets.
II. C. Liquidity Measures
The theoretical model of Kyle (1985) indicates that liquidity is a broad concept, thus not 
easily measured by one variable. That is, liquidity has more than one dimension41, including 
trading costs, trading intensity, and price impacts. In particular Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) use 
a combination of different liquidity measures and conclude that it is more informative than a 
single liquidity measure. In other words, liquidity cannot be measured by one variable alone. 
There are quite a few alternative liquidity measures. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
(2003) use a transformation of the proportion of zero daily firm returns, averaged over the 
month, as a measure of liquidity. Their liquidity measures significantly predict future returns, 
                                                
40 In their study, the measures of the level of liquidity involves Quoted Spread, % Quoted Spread, Effective Spread, 
% Effective Spread, Depth, $Depth, and Composite Liquidity (% Quoted Spread/$Depth), and Number Trades.
41 Kyle (1985) proposes that in a continuous auction equilibrium, market liquidity is a slippery and elusive concept, 
partly because it encompasses a number of transactional properties of markets, such as tightness (the cost of turning 
around a position over a short period of time), depth (the size of an order flow innovation required to change prices a 
given amount), and resiliency (the speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative shock). 
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whereas alternative measures such as turnover do not. Amihud (2002) proposes a price impact 
measure, defined as the absolute value of stock returns scaled by dollar volume. The measure of 
stock illiquidity is the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar volume, averaged over 
some period. It can be interpreted as the average price response associated with one dollar of 
trading volume, thus serving as a rough measure of price impact. Jun, Marathe, and Shawky 
(2003) analyze some emerging market stocks and use the turnover ratio as a proxy for liquidity. 
Interestingly, they find a positive relation between returns and market turnover, a finding that is 
also inconsistent with risk and return tradeoff.  Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) use price 
impact, which is the price response to signed order flow (order size), and the fixed cost of trading 
to measure stock illiquidity, and find that these measures of illiquidity positively affect stock 
returns. Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) employ the turnover rate as a proxy for liquidity on 
monthly return data for NYSE stocks over the period 1962 to 1991. Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) 
measure liquidity by using the amortized effective spread42 and document that liquidity 
positively affects stock returns. Chordia et al. (2001b) use both dollar trading volume and stock 
turnover to measure liquidity. 
In sum, these studies imply two important points. First, the use of different liquidity 
measures sometimes produces conflicting results. Second, liquidity has many dimensions: 
trading costs, trading intensity, and the impact of trading on prices (price impacts). 
II. D. Behavioral Finance Arguments as Possible Explanations for the Puzzle
During past several decades, a considerable number of studies have introduced investor 
psychology to explain stock price movements and some empirical puzzles43. Here we 
concentrate on the studies related to sentiment and the Prospect Theory developed by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979). Under the Prospect theory, agents’ attitudes differ across the positive and 
negative domains of the utility function such that individual investors are risk-seeking over 
losses and risk-averse over gains. Also under the theory, investors with loss aversion preference 
react more strongly to losses than they do to gains, and therefore more losers cause more trading. 
                                                
42 The effective spread the absolute difference between the mid-point of the quoted bid-ask spread and the 
transaction price that follows, classified as being a buy or sell transaction, and then divided by the stock’s holding 
period, obtained from the turnover rate on the stock, to obtain the amortized spread. In other words, amortized 
spread is spread adjusted by the holding period.
43 Prast (2004) summarizes such puzzles as stock price under- and overreactions, excessive trading and the gender 
puzzle, financial hypes and panic, the equity premium puzzle, the winner or loser puzzle, and the dividend puzzle.
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Another strand of behavioral finance considers the role of sentiment. Generally, studies 
on sentiment suggest that sentiment-driven trading increases market liquidity. For example, Liu 
(2006) and Kurov (2008) provide empirical evidence that the stock market is more liquid when 
investor sentiment is higher. In other related work, Fisher and Statman (2000) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) recognize that investor sentiment may be an important component of the market 
pricing process. Some theoretical studies posit that investor behavior is correlated with asset 
pricing. Barberis, Schleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998)’s theoretical models of stock returns allow for optimistic expectations. When investors 
overestimate growth prospects, stocks are overvalued. As optimistic expectations are not 
fulfilled, the returns of these stocks will be low. In another theoretical study by De long, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990), investor sentiment is defined as the irrational expectations that 
noise traders have about the future stock price. The demand of noise traders for stocks is driven 
by their sentiment, and the higher investor sentiment, the greater the amount of noise trading and 
liquidity. 
Consistent with the findings above, Graham, Harvey and Huang (2004) point out that 
individual investor overconfidence can explain why investors trade more frequently and hold 
more internationally diversified portfolios. Campbell and Kraussl (2006) show that the level of 
risk aversion depends crucially on the confidence level associated with the investor downside 
risk constraint: the more safety the investor requires, the higher the confidence level associated 
with the downside risk constraint and the less tolerant the investor is to risk. 
III. Methodology and Data
III. A. A Model for the Relation between Excess Return and Liquidity Risk
Following Chordia et al (2001b), the excess return is computed as (1)   ,, ttiti RFrr  , 
where ri,t is the return on each stock i in month t and RFt is the return on the riskless asset. 
Alternatively, the excess return tir , can be calculated as the following based on Fama and French 
(1993) model. 
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iHMLiSMBiMKTiitti HMLSMBMKTRFr  ,,,, (1’)44
The independent variables include market risk premium MKT = RM - RF, the size premium 
SMB, and the book-to-market premium HML, in month t. βi,k is the kth factor loading, βMKT, 
βSMB, and βHML, for each stock i; The factor loadings are estimated from month t – 60 to month t
– 2.
Following Chordia et al. (2001b), the excess returns are used as the dependent variable in 
the following regression:
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where 
o
    

tir , is the excess return, or the raw return less the risk-free rate, on stock i in month t
o     c0 is the intercept term for the regression; cm is the coefficients on characteristic m
o     ei,t is a random error term.
o     Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock characteristic m for stock i in month t; M is the 
number of the characteristic variables. 
SIZE – the natural logarithm of the market value of the equity of the firm at month t – 2;
BM – the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity plus deferred taxes to 
the market value of equity, using the previous year data as in Fama and French (1992);
PRICE – the natural logarithm of the reciprocal of the share price at month t – 2;
YLD – the dividend yield as measured by the sum of all dividends paid over the previous 
12 months, divided by the share price at moth t – 2;
MOMENTUM:  
     RET 2-3 – the cumulative return over the two months ending at the beginning 
of the previous month, which can be written as (1 + rt-2)(1 + rt-3) – 1
     RET 4-6 – the cumulative return over the three months ending 3 months 
previously, which can be written as 1)1(
6
4
 

 ht
h
r
                                                
44 In Chordia et al. (2001b), the alternative methods used to compute the excess return give similar results. 
Therefore, we only use Equation (1) to compute the excess return.   
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     RET 7-12 – the cumulative return over the six months ending 6 months 
previously, which can be written as 1)1(
12
7
 

 ht
h
r
o    LIQUID – the natural logarithm of the alternative measures of liquidity for stock i
during month t – 2; β1 is the coefficient on LIQUID. As argued earlier, it is potentially 
useful to capture liquidity using alternative measures. To verify their results, our first two 
liquidity measures are the same as those of Chordia et al (2001b), followed by alternative 
measures of liquidity.
      LIQ_1: Dollar Trading Volume which is calculated by stock price times shares traded
      LIQ_2: Turnover or the ratio of trading volume over shares outstanding:
ti
i,t
ti NSO
TVS
TURNOVER
,
, 
where TVSi,t is the trading volume in shares of stock i at month t and NSOi,t is the number 
of shares outstanding of stock i at month t. A variation of this is given in Johnson (2008), 
which calculate turnover by taking the ratio of dollar volume to the average of beginning-
of-month and end-of-month capitalization. A stock with a higher (lower) turnover rate 
indicates that investors tend to hold the stock over a shorter (longer) time horizon, 
therefore the stock is considered as more (less) liquid. As documented by Amihud and 
mendelson (1986), illiquid assets would be held by investors over a longer time horizon.
      LIQ_3: Share Trading Volume or the number of shares traded
     LIQ_4: Amivest Ratio, used by Cooper, Goth, and Avera (1985), Amihud, Mendelson, 
and Lauterbach (1997), and Berkman and Elsewarapu (1998), is computed as the ratio of 
the sum of the daily volume to the sum of the daily absolute return. The larger the 
number, the smaller the price changes relative to trading volume, thus the more liquid 
the market. 
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      LIQ_5: Amihud Illiquidity Ratio or price impact which is the absolute value of price 
percentage change over dollar trading volume (it is roughly the inverse of Amivest ratio). 
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This measure follows Amihud (2002)45 and is based on the idea that illiquidity is the 
relationship between the price change and the associated order flow or trading volume (or 
the response of price to order flow). The computation of the illiquidity ratio for individual 
stocks can be described as the ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading 
volume on that day, averaged over one month:
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where ri,d,t is the return on stock i on day d in month t and DVOLi,d,t is the corresponding 
daily dollar trading volume on day d. Di,t is the number of daily observations during 
month t for stock i. The ratio gives the absolute price change per dollar of monthly 
trading volume, or the monthly price impact of the order flow. The larger the number, the 
larger the price impact of trading and the less liquid the market.
o     LIQ_VOLATILITY – Following Chordia et al. (2001b), we use the coefficient of 
variations in liquidity as the measure of liquidity risk. More specifically:
     CV_LIQ: The natural logarithm of the coefficient of variation (ratio of standard 
deviation to the mean) of each measure of liquidity calculated over month t – 37 to t –
2.46
III. B. Data
III. B. 1. Data Selection
The data covers common stocks47 (CRSP share code = 10 and 11) traded in NYSE and 
AMEX during January 1975 and December 2008. Data on book-to-market ratio is obtained from 
                                                
45 He finds that over time excess returns are an increasing function of expected illiquidity of the stock market.
46 We also perform the same analysis using the standard deviation of liquidity. There are however several reasons 
why the coefficient of variation might be appropriate. First, the coefficient of variation of liquidity incorporates the 
standard deviation and the level of liquidity concurrently and relatively. Second, we find that liquidity measures are 
highly correlated with their standard deviations but not with their coefficients of variations; thus, the use of the 
coefficient of variation is likely subject to a lower degree of multi-collinearity problem. Moreover, since the metrics 
of alternative liquidity measures are different, the use of standard deviation makes comparisons across different 
measures less straightforward.
47 The following securities were not included in the sample since their trading characteristics might differ from 
ordinary equities: ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, units, companies incorporated outside the U.S., Americus 
Trust components, closed-end funds, preferred stocks and REITs.
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COMPUSTAT. A stock included in the sample for a given month has to satisfy the following 
criteria: individual stock’s return in the current month, t, and in 24 of the previous 60 months has 
to be available from CRSP; sufficient data has to be available to calculate the size, price, and 
dividend yield as of month t – 2, as well as the different measures of liquidity over the previous 
36 months; sufficient data has to be available on the COMPUSTAT tapes to calculate the book to 
market ratio as of December of the previous year; book-to-market ratios are winsorized at 0.995 
and 0.005 fractiles; stocks with prices below $5 and above $1,000 in any given month are 
excluded for that month. Our total number of firm-month observations is 415,403 and our sample 
includes an average of 1660 stocks each month. Comparing with the sample employed in 
Chordia et al. (2001), we extend ours to the recent data on stocks and analyze a longer period of 
time period than that in their paper.
The variables employed in the time-series and cross-sectional regression involve stock’s 
raw return, one-month T-bill rate, firm size, book-to-market ratio, the reciprocal of the share 
price, the dividend yield, the lagged return variables for momentum effects, alternative liquidity 
measures, and the coefficient of variation of liquidity measures. 
III. B. 2. Descriptive Statistics
Table I provides summary descriptive statistics of monthly unlogged stock characteristics
and various liquidity proxies and their volatility used in this study. It also shows that our sample 
characteristics are similar to those typically found in the literature. The variables display 
considerable skewness. Following Chordia et al. (2001b), we take the logarithms of all firm 
characteristic variables except dividend yield and three momentum variables. Moreover, the 
transformed variables used for all of the regressions in our analysis are the deviations from the 
cross-sectional means for a given month. 
With regard to liquidity measures, the mean of dollar trading volume is about $339.6 
million and the median is much lower ($20.8 million). This indicates that its distribution is 
skewed to the right. The pattern that median is lower than mean is also shown in other liquidity 
measures. Additionally, the distributions of share trading volume and Amivest illiquidity 
measures exhibit extreme values: while the mean of shares traded is 8.76 million, its median is 
only 0.009 million, suggesting that for 1 percent change in price, the median dollar trading 
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volume was about $9,000 during our sample period. Figure I shows that the liquidity measures 
vary over time. In particular, the graph (1) indicates a rising trend in dollar trading volume, 
turnover, and share trading volume during the past two decades. We also observe a clear decline 
around 1988, immediately after the 1987 crash of stock markets.
Table II reports the cross-sectional correlations between excess return and various 
transformed characteristics variables that we use in the regression. It is not surprising that SIZE is 
highly correlated with LIQ_1 or dollar trading volume and its standard deviation. The Amihud 
measure LIQ_5 is negatively correlated (-0.87) with firm size, indicating that a given amount of 
dollar trading volume could lead to a large price movement for a small stock with a high Amihud 
measure. All liquidity measures are highly correlated with their standard deviations but not with 
their coefficients of variation. As a comparison among the different liquidity measures, Amivest 
has the highest coefficient of variation (1.86) and Turnover has the lowest variation (0.51) during 
the sample period. 
Not surprisingly, most liquidity measures are related to each other over the sample 
period. Turnover is negatively correlated (-0.71) with Amihud illiquidity ratio; this makes sense 
since trading is likely to have larger price impacts on infrequently traded stocks (due to low 
market depth or greater information asymmetry). 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics
This table provides summary descriptive statistics of monthly unlogged stock characteristics and various 
liquidity proxies and their volatility. The data covers common stocks (CRSP share code = 10 and 11) 
traded in NYSE and AMEX during January 1975 through December 2008. Data on book-to-market ratio 
is obtained from COMPUSTAT. A stock included in the sample for a given month has to satisfy the 
following criteria: individual stock’s return in the current month, t, and in 24 of the previous 60 months 
has to be available from CRSP; sufficient data has to be available to calculate the size, price, and dividend 
yield as of month t – 2, as well as the different measures of liquidity over the previous 36 months; 
sufficient data has to be available on the COMPUSTAT tapes to calculate the book to market ratio as of 
December of the previous year; book-to-market ratios are winsorized at 0.995 and 0.005 fractiles; stocks 
with prices below $5 and above $1,000 in any given month are excluded for that month.  The total 
number of firm-month observations is 415,403 and our sample includes an average of 1660 stocks each 
month. 
Mean Median Std Dev
SIZE ($ billions) 3.78 0.51 15.8
BM 0.85 0.73 0.54
Price ($) 30.09 24.5 28.4
Yield (%) 3.25 2.25 9.1
Ret2_3 (%) 3.23 2.35 14.9
Ret4_6 (%) 4.78 3.51 18.2
Ret7_12 (%) 9.38 6.67 26.80
Dollar Trading Volume ($ millions) 339.6 20.8 1430
Standard Deviation ($ millions) 115.6 13.4 404.3
Coefficient of Variation 0.60 0.54 0.29
Turnover*100 6.89 4.16 9.45
Standard Deviation *100 2.83 1.97 3.04
Coefficient of Variation 0.51 0.46 0.24
Share Trading Volume (millions) 8.76 0.009 40.7
Standard Deviation (millions) 2.8 0.005 10.3
Coefficient of Variation 0.54 0.49 0.24
Amivest Liquidity (billions) 86.6 0.004 27200
Standard Deviation (billions) 817 0.04 38200
Coefficient of Variation 1.86 1.61 0.89
Amihud (2002) Illiquidity*10-6 6.18 0.06 91.3
Standard Deviation *10-6 4.23 0.04 34.6
Coefficient of Variation 0.70 0.61 0.37
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Table II Correlation between Excess Return and Explanatory Variables
The table presents the cross-sectional correlations between EXCESS RET and the transformed variables that we use in the regression. EXCESS 
RET is the excess monthly return from January 1975 through December 2008. SIZE is the logarithm of the market capitalization of firms in billions 
of dollars. BM is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. PRICE is the logarithm of the share price reciprocal. YIELD is the dividend yield. 
RET2_3, RET4_6, and RET7_12 denote the cumulative returns over month t – 3 to t – 2, t – 6 to t – 4, and t – 12 to t – 7, respectively. LIQ_1 to 
LIQ_5 denote alternative liquidity measures: Dollar Trading Volume, Turnover, Share Trading Volume, Amivest Liquidity, and Amihud 
Illiquidity, respectively. CV_LIQ_1 to CV_LIQ_5 denote the coefficient of variation of alternative liquidity measures over month t – 37 to t – 2. 
SD_LIQ_1 to SD_LIQ_5 denote the standard deviation of alternative liquidity measures over month t – 37 to t – 2. All variables except EXCESS 
RET, YIELD, and three momentum effect variables are expressed as the deviation from their monthly cross-sectional mean in each month. 
EXCESS RET SIZE BM PRICE YIELD RET2_3 RET4_6 RET7_12 LIQ_1 LIQ_2 LIQ_3 LIQ_4 LIQ_5
SIZE 0.043 1
BM -0.121 -0.575 1
PRICE -0.169 -0.464 0.477 1
YIELD 0.014 -0.109 0.076 0.121 1
RET2_3 -0.033 0.040 -0.134 -0.205 -0.031 1
RET4_6 0.005 0.051 -0.155 -0.218 -0.028 -0.048 1
RET7_12 0.005 0.078 -0.210 -0.264 -0.027 0.010 -0.022 1
LIQ_1 0.035 0.886 -0.471 -0.390 -0.080 0.018 0.032 0.056 1
SD_LIQ_1 -0.058 0.828 -0.394 -0.248 -0.033 -0.068 -0.047 -0.021 0.875
CV_LIQ_1 0.004 -0.270 0.023 -0.022 0.022 0.063 0.111 0.198 -0.214
LIQ_2 0.016 0.499 -0.214 -0.192 -0.023 -0.012 0.001 0.013 0.844 1
SD_LIQ_2 -0.033 0.362 -0.152 -0.095 0.013 -0.039 -0.025 -0.009 0.561 0.629
CV_LIQ_2 0.010 -0.358 0.146 0.117 0.064 0.023 0.030 0.049 -0.301 -0.148
LIQ_3 -0.018 0.806 -0.352 -0.093 -0.047 -0.048 -0.037 -0.027 0.953 0.849 1
SD_LIQ_3 -0.050 0.768 -0.318 -0.033 -0.023 -0.076 -0.073 -0.073 0.827 0.657 0.883
CV_LIQ_3 0.001 -0.255 0.042 0.109 0.055 0.013 0.025 0.076 -0.221 -0.118 -0.203
LIQ_4 -0.050 0.746 -0.390 -0.353 -0.075 0.037 0.033 0.047 0.784 0.602 0.732 1
SD_LIQ_4 -0.043 0.668 -0.286 -0.188 -0.031 -0.066 -0.057 -0.056 0.691 0.518 0.685 0.578
CV_LIQ_4 -0.009 0.155 -0.085 -0.074 -0.004 -0.015 -0.001 0.009 0.177 0.151 0.167 0.140
LIQ_5 -0.013 -0.874 0.452 0.442 0.111 -0.039 -0.037 -0.053 -0.923 -0.714 -0.853 -0.783 1
SD_LIQ_5 0.056 -0.805 0.305 0.243 0.062 0.084 0.085 0.107 -0.802 -0.568 -0.787 -0.673 0.847
CV_LIQ_5 0.023 -0.220 0.011 0.022 0.019 0.031 0.051 0.107 -0.173 -0.069 -0.180 -0.172 0.213
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IV. Empirical Relations between Returns and Liquidity Risk
The empirical results regarding the liquidity risk premium using alternative liquidity 
measures are reported in Table III.48  The table contains five regression specifications from [1] to 
[5], each specification corresponding to a different measure of liquidity – dollar trading volume, 
turnover, share trading volume, Amivest ratio, and Amihud illiquidity ratio (which is close to the 
inverse of Amivest ratio), respectively. If all of them capture the true liquidity, the expected 
signs between excess returns and each of the liquidity measures are stated in parentheses as 
follows: dollar volume ( - ), turnover ( - ), share volume ( - ), Amivest ratio ( - ), and Amihud 
ratio ( + ). As for liquidity risk, we expect a positive relation between returns and liquidity risk, 
regardless of how liquidity is measured. However, to the extent that Johnson (2008) argument is 
correct that trading volume itself reflects liquidity volatility, then the expected sign between 
return and volatility of trading volume-based liquidity measures would be ambiguous. The 
volatility of liquidity is computed as the coefficient of variation of alternative liquidity measures 
over the month t – 37 to t – 2.  The number of firm-month observations varies across regressions 
due to missing value and zero returns (i.e., zero price changes), because zero returns would 
render the Amivest ratio undefined. Except for the regression involving the Amivest ratio, the 
number of observations for a regression is roughly 300,000. The sample covers the period from 
1975 to 2008.
We first discuss the results on the control variables then turn to our focus of the relation 
between returns and liquidity level and, especially, the relation between returns and the volatility 
of liquidity. The firm-characteristic control variables, dividend yield, and three momentum 
variables have consistent explanatory power for excess return across all regressions. The results 
imply that investors require higher excess return for small and value stocks and stocks at lower 
prices. With few exceptions, all regression specifications indicate a negative but insignificant 
relation between dividend yield and excess return.  Regarding the results on past returns, the 
cumulative return over month t-2 and t-3 has a significantly negative impact on excess return 
across all regression specifications. Most coefficients on the cumulative return over month t-4 to 
t-6 have positive but insignificant sign. For all regressions, the cumulative return over month t-7 
                                                
48 To facilitate comparison with Chordia et al. (2001b), we perform regressions without liquidity risk, as they do. 
These results are given in Table A1 of the appendix. 
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to t-12 is positively and significantly related with excess return. It appears that prior 2 to 3 
months winners have significantly lower expected return, whereas the prior 7 to 12 months 
winners have significantly high expected return. That implies that investors do not chase the 
near-term winner but chase the intermediate term winner during our analysis period. These 
results concerning the control variables are similar in all subsequent tables, so we will focus on 
the variables related to liquidity from this point on. 
The coefficients of alternative liquidity measures are of the expected signs with the 
exception of regression [3], where share trading volume is used as the proxy for liquidity; 
moreover, all coefficients are significant with the exception of regressions [1], [2], and [3]. 
Recall that regressions [1] – [3] all involve trading-volume-based liquidity. Therefore, the results 
suggest that Johnson (2008) might be correct in suggesting that trading volume is an 
inappropriate metric for liquidity. Other than trading volume, these results are consistent with the 
notion that returns are greater the lower the liquidity, because investors require higher returns as 
a compensation for low liquidity. 
Concerning our focus the relation between returns and liquidity volatility, we find 
strikingly different results using different liquidity measures. Using all three trading-volume-
based liquidity volatility in regressions [1] to [3], we find a significantly negative coefficient of 
liquidity volatility. These are consistent with Chordia et al. (2001b) whose methodology 
corresponds to regressions [1] and [2], but inconsistent with a tradeoff between return and 
liquidity risk. The results further reinforce the idea that trading volume might not capture 
liquidity adequately. When we measure liquidity by the effects of trading on prices in regressions 
[4] and [5], we find a significantly positive relation between returns and liquidity risk. This is 
consistent with a significantly positive tradeoff between returns and liquidity risk and might
resolve the liquidity risk premium puzzle. 
It should be emphasized that our doubts concerning volume as an appropriate liquidity 
measure do not come solely on the arguments of Johnson (2008), they are also based on our 
empirical findings, namely 1) a negative relation between volume volatility and returns that 
contradicts tradeoff between risk and return and 2) a positive relation between price impact 
volatility and returns that is consistent with a tradeoff. Nevertheless, even if trading volume does 
not adequately capture liquidity, it is still difficult to explain a negative relation between return 
and the volatility of volume. A partial reconciliation of the differences in results using alternative 
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liquidity measures is that price impact is arguably more important for at least the large traders. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the amount of trading, aside from the theoretical 
argument that it might not capture liquidity, is not as important as the composition of volume; 
more specifically, traders might be more concerned about the where trading comes from—the 
more it comes from informed trading, the less a high trading volume is desirable. However, the 
above argument may explain an insignificant relation between returns and volume volatility, but 
does not explain a significant negative relation as we find here. Consequently, this argument only 
partially addresses the puzzle and we need to further explore potential factors that might help to 
resolve the liquidity risk puzzle. Before we turn to the analysis involving potential factors, some 
robustness checks are in order. Since we suspect, as argued earlier, that aversion to liquidity risk 
might depend on market conditions, a natural robustness test is to check whether results are 
sensitive to time period; this robustness check and others are presented next.  
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Table III. Regression of Excess Return on Liquidity, Liquidity Risk and Control Variables
The OLS estimate results are reported in this table which contains five regressions [1] to [5], each with a 
different measure of liquidity – Dollar Trading Volume, Turnover, Share Trading Volume, Amivest 
Liquidity, and Amihud Illiquidity, respectively. The sample period is from January 1975 through 
December 2008.  The excess returns are used as the dependent variable in the following regression:
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where tir , denotes excess return on stock i in month t;  Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock characteristic 
m for stock i in month t; M is the number of the characteristic variables. LIQUID denotes alternative 
liquidity measures. tiVOLATILITYLIQ ,_ denotes liquidity volatility. In the table below, SIZE is the 
logarithm of the market capitalization of firms in billions of dollars. BM is the logarithm of the book-to-
market ratio. PRICE is the logarithm of the share price reciprocal. YIELD is the dividend yield. RET2_3, 
RET4_6, and RET7_12 denote the cumulative returns over month t – 3 to t – 2, t – 6 to t – 4, and t – 12 to 
t – 7, respectively. CV_LIQ is the coefficient of variation of liquidity over month t – 37 to t – 2. All 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. All variables except EXCESS RET, YIELD, and three momentum 
effect variables are expressed as the deviation from their monthly cross-sectional mean in each month.  t-
statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by a, b, and c, 
respectively. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SIZE -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.24 -0.33
(-8.23)a (-13.66)a (-8.59)a (-5.28)a (-6.94)a
BM 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.74 0.67
(13.29)a (13.47)a (12.89)a (11.14)a (12.77)a
PRICE 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.84 0.78
(15.96)a (16.13)a (14.64)a (11.80)a (13.72)a
YIELD -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 0.88 -0.33
(-0.59) (-0.52) (-0.51) (2.25) (-1.48)
RET2_3 -1.63 -1.65 -1.63 -1.62 -1.99
(-11.92)a (-12.06)a (-11.91)a (-8.94)a (-14.30)a
RET4_6 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.56
(0.73) (0.49) (0.65) (-0.21) (4.97)a
RET7_12 1.18 1.16 1.17 1.14 0.95
(15.35)a (15.19)a (15.36)a (11.28)a (12.25)a
LIQUID -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.09 0.03
(-0.04) (-0.08) (0.04) (-4.26)a (1.28)
CV_LIQ -0.25 -0.33 -0.38 0.13 0.30
(-4.16)a (-5.24)a (-6.48)a (2.05)b (4.80)a
_CONS 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
(44.74)a (44.97)a (44.90)a (32.17)a (42.58)a
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Sub-Period Results and Other Robustness Checks
The sample period is separated into three sub-periods: 1975/01 – 1984/12, 1985/01 –
1994/12, and 1995/01 – 2008/12, which will be referred to as sub-periods 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. We perform the same analysis on each of the sub-periods and the results are shown 
in Table IV. We first concentrate on trading-volume-based measures. As in Table III, some 
results using trading volume are counter-intuitive and contrary to our expectations for both the 
level of trading volume and the volatility of volume. In particular, sub-period 2 results indicate 
that returns are higher the greater the volume. If greater volume proxies for greater liquidity, 
returns should be lower, not higher. Even more counter-intuitive, all coefficients of liquidity 
volatility are negative in regressions [1] to [3] and in all sub-periods, although in two out of nine 
cases, they are not statistically significant. Therefore, in both level and volatility of trading 
volume, the results cast serious doubt whether trading volume can serve as an adequate proxy for 
liquidity. As for liquidity measures that are based on price impacts in regressions [4] and [5], we 
find a negative relation between returns and Amivest ratio and a positive relation between returns 
and Amihud ratio, which are consistent with our expectations and consistent with those in Table 
III. However, the results regarding volatility of price impacts are not robust. More specifically, in 
sub-periods 2 and 3 and using the Amivest ratio, and in sub-period 1 and using Amihud ratio, the 
relation between return and liquidity risk is positive as expected, but not statistically significant. 
As noted in descriptive statistics, all liquidity measures are highly correlated with firm 
size. For this reason, we perform an additional robustness check by excluding the level of 
liquidity in each regression and re-estimate the relation between excess return and the coefficient 
of variation of liquidity. The full-period results are similar to those mentioned above thus not 
reported. Another robustness check is to use the first difference of liquidity risk, which is 
justified by stationarity test that shows liquidity risk is non-stationary. The results are largely 
similar to that in Table III: volatility of price impact is positively correlated with returns and 
consistent with a tradeoff between risk and return; liquidity risk based on trading volume remains 
mixed.49
                                                
49 These results are reported in Table A2 in the appendix.   
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Table IV. Regression of Excess Return on Explanatory Variables for Sub-periods
The sample period is separated into three sub-periods: 1975/01 – 1984/12, 1985/01 – 1994/12, and 1995/01 – 2008/12. The table 
contains five regressions [1] to [5], each with a different measure of liquidity – Dollar Trading Volume, Turnover, Share Trading 
Volume, Amivest Liquidity, and Amihud Illiquidity, respectively. For each regression specification, the same analysis on each of the 
sub-periods is performed. The excess returns are used as the dependent variable in the following regression:
              (2)    _ ,,2,1,,
1
0, titititim
M
m
mti eVOLATILITYLIQLIQUIDZccr  


where tir , denotes excess return on stock i in month t;  Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock characteristic m for stock i in month t; M 
is the number of the characteristic variables. LIQUID denotes alternative liquidity measures. tiVOLATILITYLIQ ,_ denotes liquidity 
volatility. In the table below, SIZE is the logarithm of the market capitalization of firms in billions of dollars. BM is the logarithm of 
the book-to-market ratio. PRICE is the logarithm of the share price reciprocal. YIELD is the dividend yield. RET2_3, RET4_6, and 
RET7_12 denote the cumulative returns over month t – 3 to t – 2, t – 6 to t – 4, and t – 12 to t – 7, respectively. CV_LIQ is the 
coefficient of variation of liquidity over month t – 37 to t – 2. All variables except EXCESS RET, YIELD, and three momentum effect 
variables are expressed as the deviation from their monthly cross-sectional mean in each month. All coefficients are multiplied by 100.  
t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by a, b, and c, respectively. 
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Table IV. (Continued)
[1] [2] [3]
75/01-84/12 85/01-94/12 95/01-08/12 75/01-84/12 85/01-94/12 95/01-08/12 75/01-84/12 85/01-94/12 95/01-08/12
SIZE -0.16 -1.15 -0.41 -0.41 -0.95 -0.61 -0.19 -1.12 -0.44
(-1.68)c (-12.91)a (-4.95)a (-6.53)a (-15.28)a (-11.08)a (-1.97)b (-12.86)a (-5.29)a
BM 1.34 0.45 0.61 1.34 0.46 0.61 1.33 0.44 0.59
(12.27)a (4.81)a (7.83)a (12.37)a (4.95)a (7.81)a (12.12)a (4.73)a (7.52)a
PRICE 1.08 0.32 0.80 1.09 0.32 0.81 1.33 0.17 0.96
(10.23)a (3.23)a (8.97)a (10.25)a (3.27)a (9.15)a (11.20)a (1.53) (9.75)a
YIELD -0.32 0.16 0.65 -0.31 0.17 0.68 -0.33 0.16 0.66
(-0.79) (0.50) (1.42) (-0.78) (0.54) (1.49) (-0.81) (0.53) (1.45)
RET2_3 -0.65 -2.48 -1.74 -0.66 -2.51 -1.72 -0.63 -2.50 -1.73
(-2.61)a (-9.95)a (-7.78)a (-2.65)a (-10.12)a (-7.71)a (-2.57)a (-10.06)a (-7.75)a
RET4_6 0.53 -1.41 0.84 0.51 -1.46 0.84 0.54 -1.45 0.83
(2.71)a (-7.00)a (4.48)a (2.65)a (-7.29)a (4.55)a (2.81)a (-7.23)a (4.49)a
RET7_12 1.16 1.15 1.53 1.15 1.11 1.53 1.17 1.12 1.52
(9.02)a (8.16)a (11.36)a (9.05)a (7.93)a (11.54)a (9.22)a (7.98)a (11.48)a
LIQUID -0.25 0.18 -0.14 -0.26 0.17 -0.13 -0.24 0.17 -0.14
(-4.77)a (3.76)a (-3.15)a (-4.92)a (3.49)a (-2.89)a (-4.59)a (3.61)a (-3.11)a
CV_LIQ -0.07 -0.30 -0.15 -0.02 -0.24 -0.51 -0.20 -0.27 -0.36
(-0.58) (-3.03)a (-1.62)c (-0.15) (-2.37)b (-4.80)a (-1.75)c (-2.72)a (-3.79)a
_CONS 0.38 1.07 1.37 0.38 1.08 1.37 0.39 1.08 1.36
(7.73)a (29.32)a (28.71)a (7.72)a (29.38)a (28.97)a (7.82)a (29.40)a (28.79)a
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Table IV. (Continued)
[4] [5]
75/01-84/12 85/01-94/12 95/01-08/12 75/01-84/12 85/01-94/12 95/01-08/12
SIZE -0.34 -0.79 -0.41 -0.29 -0.47 -0.44
(-3.41)a (-8.07)a (-5.87)a (-2.86)a (-5.81)a (-6.12)a
BM 1.27 0.51 0.67 1.33 0.54 0.65
(8.21)a (3.94)a (7.41)a (10.57)a (6.01)a (8.47)a
PRICE 0.99 0.22 0.73 0.42 0.25 0.83
(6.68)a (1.59) (7.12)a (3.38)a (2.58)a (9.41)a
YIELD 1.35 1.83 1.04 -0.64 0.24 0.59
(1.37) (3.02)a (1.77)c (-1.51) (0.77) (1.28)
RET2_3 -0.37 -3.15 -1.57 -1.99 -2.36 -1.69
(-1.04) (-8.94)a (-5.93)a (-7.15)a (-9.77)a (-7.76)a
RET4_6 0.03 -1.66 0.79 2.65 -1.54 0.79
(0.10) (-5.82)a (3.61)a (12.01)a (-7.91)a (4.40)a
RET7_12 1.19 0.87 1.48 0.59 1.07 1.32
(6.54)a (4.41)a (9.49)a (4.02)a (8.00)a (10.51)a
LIQUID -0.14 -0.05 -0.13 0.19 0.30 0.09
(-3.27)a (-1.15) (-4.56)a (3.63)a (6.44)a (2.27)b
CV_LIQ 0.32 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.37 0.68
(2.35)b (0.53) (0.82) (0.17) (3.54)a (7.12)a
_CONS 0.36 1.05 1.37 0.32 0.99 1.43
(4.69)a (19.60)a (23.31)a (5.47)a (26.35)a (30.30)a
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A Summary on Liquidity Risk Puzzle
To this point we investigate the existence of the liquidity risk puzzle by using various 
measures of liquidity and find that the puzzle does exist for some measures of liquidity, in 
particular trading-volume-based liquidity (dollar and share trading volumes, and turnover). 
Moreover, the empirical relation between returns and both the level and volatility of trading 
volume are often counter-intuitive. This reinforces the argument by Johnson (2008) that trading 
volume does not adequately capture liquidity. The puzzle disappears when liquidity is measured 
by Amivest liquidity and Amihud illiquidity ratios that are based on price impacts. Furthermore, 
the sub-period results suggest that the results are sensitive to sample periods. In sum, we can
conclude that a negative liquidity risk premium is not a robust result and that there is evidence 
suggesting that volume might not capture true liquidity.  
The results indirectly suggest liquidity has multi-dimensions and a single measure of 
liquidity may not adequately capture the role of liquidity in pricing. The sub-period results tend 
to be more mixed than those in the full period, suggesting that liquidity risk attitude might 
depend on market conditions. Also, our literature review suggests that some behavioral 
tendencies might help in resolving the liquidity risk puzzle. Consequently in the next section, we 
investigate whether market conditions, firm size, and an index of investor sentiment affect the 
results.  
V. Potential Factors that Might Influence the Return-Liquidity Risk Relation
V. A. The Impact of Market Condition on the Relation between Liquidity Risk and 
Excess Return
As suggested by behavioral finance theories such as Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
investors tend to be more concerned about losses than gains such that their trading strategy in up 
(bullish) markets and down (bearish) markets will diverge. Specifically, the Prospect Theory 
suggests that investors evaluate risky prospects based on changes in their wealth (a change can 
be positive or negative), but not based on subsequent levels of wealth. It is plausible that during 
extreme down markets, investors might act erratically (e.g., loss-averse and risk-seeking) and 
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pursue risky trades to break even or turn a profit. If so, it is plausible that we could observe, 
simultaneously, low returns and great variations in liquidity. The liquidity volatility can be 
further magnified by short-selling restrictions that are more likely to be restrictive under extreme 
down markets. Motivated by this and some empirical studies50, we test whether the relation 
between excess return and volatility of liquidity differ between down and up markets. 
Literature provides various ways to classify down and up market51. Inspired by Fabozzi 
and Francis (1977), we compute the extreme down markets as CRSP value-weighted monthly 
market return being 1.5 times its standard deviations below mean return. For tractability and ease 
of interpretation, we employ a dummy variable approach. Alternatively, we can partition the total 
sample months into two mutually exclusive subsets: one set includes months in which market 
returns rm,t was 1.5 standard deviations below the market mean, which is referred to the extreme
down category; the other set includes the remaining months. However, this partitioning 
procedure ignores trends in the market.
Specifically, we test the sensitivity to market conditions by the following regression 
equation: 
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where
o     Dt is a dummy variable which assumes the value of one in extreme down market and 
zero otherwise; the extreme down market is defined as market return being 1.5 standard 
deviation below mean returns.
o
   
tiVOLATILITYLIQ ,_ denotes liquidity risk and is measured by the coefficient of 
variation of alternative liquidity measure over month t – 37 to t – 2.
o    and  are the coefficients on Dt and the interaction term tit VOLATILITYLIQD ,_* , 
respectively. They measure the differential effects introduced by extreme down markets. 
                                                
50 See literature reviewed in section II.B. Also, Bhardwaj and Brooks (1993) indicate significant differences between 
systematic risk in bull and bear markets. Howton and Peterson (1998) show the importance of changing systematic 
risk over bull and bear markets. It is plausible that liquidity beta also varies through time.
51 Bhardwaj and Brooks (1993) use the median return on the market portfolio as the demarcating value with which 
to separate bull from bear months. Wiggins (1992) and Chen (1982) define up (down) markets as months in which 
the market excess return was greater (less) than zero. Fabozzi and Francis (1977 and 1979) define substantial up
(down) months as months in which the return on the market portfolio was greater (less) than 1.5 times its standard 
deviation, thereby separating the market into periods when the market was substantially up or down or neither. 
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o     It is expected that in normal markets the relation between return and liquidity volatility 
is positive, whereas in down markets the relation can be negative. That is, the coefficient 
δ is expected to be negative.
The results are reported in Table V. Recall in previous tables, the coefficients on volume-
related are mostly insignificant. Here, the coefficients of dollar trading volume, turnover, and 
share trading volume, as shown in regressions [1], [2], and [3], respectively, become positive and 
statistically significant. A positive relation between volume and return contradicts trading 
volume as an appropriate measure of liquidity. The coefficient on Amivest in regression [4] 
continues to have the expected sign and the statistical significance level consistent with the 
previous results. However, the coefficient on Amihud in regression [5] becomes insignificantly 
negative. 
As for the coefficients on liquidity risk, again results using trading-volume-related risk 
are counter-intuitive: here they are significantly negative, contrary to the notion of tradeoff 
between risk and returns. The coefficients of price-impact-liquidity-risk remain to be positive 
and statistically significant as in Table III. We note that all negative coefficients that are contrary 
to a positive tradeoff between returns and liquidity risk are much smaller in magnitude, 
compared to those in Table III. Hence, the addition of market condition variables appears to 
reduce the magnitude of the puzzle but does not completely resolve the puzzle.  
The dummy variable for market condition in all regressions has a negative and 
statistically significant sign. This indicates that under extreme down market, or Dt = 1, excess 
return would approximately be lower by 10 percent, holding other things constant, during our 
sample period. This is not surprising as the dummy should capture extreme down markets.
All coefficients on the interaction terms between liquidity risk and market dummy 
variable are negative, and all are significant with the exception of regression [4].  This piece of 
result can be consistent with the Prospect Theory, as described earlier. It indicates that the loss-
averse investors who take higher liquidity risk under extreme down market require lower 
premium. Simply put, investors tend to be risk averse under a normal or up market and relatively 
risk seeking under an extreme down market. 
In greater details, the relation between returns and liquidity risk would depend on market 
conditions and requires the examination of two coefficients. In normal or up market months, Dt = 
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0, the impact of liquidity risk on excess return is 22  tD based on Equation (3). In 
extreme down market months, Dt = 1,  22 tD represents the impact of liquidity risk
on excess return. The table indicates that if Dt = 0 or under normal or up market, for one percent 
increase in the volatility of dollar trading volume, turnover, and share trading volume, the 
premium required by investors decreases by 0.03, 0.13, and 0.16 percent, respectively, holding 
other things constant. For the volatility of Amivest liquidity and Amihud illiquidity, one percent 
increase in volatility would be associated with a premium increases by 0.20 and 0.27 percent, 
respectively. On the other hand, if Dt = 1 or under extreme down market, for one percent increase 
in the volatility of dollar trading volume, turnover, share trading volume, Amivest liquidity, and 
Amihud illiquidity, the premium required would all decrease by 2.89 (i.e., 0.03 + 2.86), 2.52, 
3.12, 0.03, and 3.48, respectively, holding other things constant. These empirical results indicate 
that the impact of the price-based liquidity risk on excess return is significantly positive under 
normal or up market and negative under extreme down market. The negative relation between 
trading-volume-related liquidity risk and excess return becomes stronger and even more dramatic 
under the extreme down markets.
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Table V. The Impact of Market Condition on the Puzzle
Table V reports the estimated coefficients in regressions [1] – [5] where liquidity is measured by Dollar 
Trading Volume, Turnover, Share Trading Volume, Amivest Liquidity, and Amihud Illiquidity, 
respectively. The sample period is from January 1975 through December 2008.  The following regression 
equation is used to test the sensitivity to market conditions:
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where tir , denotes excess return on stock i in month t;  Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock characteristic 
m for stock i in month t; M is the number of the characteristic variables. LIQUID denotes alternative 
liquidity measures. tiVOLATILITYLIQ ,_ denotes liquidity volatility. Dt denotes market dummy variable
assuming the value of one in extreme down market and zero otherwise; the extreme down market is 
defined as market return being 1.5 standard deviations below mean returns. tit VOLATILITYLIQD ,_*
is the interaction term between market dummy variable and liquidity risk. In the table below, CV_LIQ is 
the coefficient of variation of liquidity over month t – 37 to t – 2. All variables except EXCESS RET, 
YIELD, three momentum effect variables, and Dt are expressed as the deviation from their monthly cross-
sectional mean in each month. All coefficients are multiplied by 100.  t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by a, b, and c, respectively. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SIZE -0.64 -0.40 -0.65 -0.10 -0.33
(-13.05)a (-13.48)a (-13.65)a (-2.32)b (-7.14)a
BM 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.64
(13.17)a (13.31)a (12.75)a (11.01)a (12.55)a
PRICE 0.93 0.94 0.71 0.93 0.79
(17.20)a (17.45)a (11.73)a (13.50)a (14.33)a
YIELD -0.35 -0.34 -0.33 0.72 -0.45
(-1.65)c (-1.58) (-1.56) (1.90)c (-2.07)b
RET2_3 -1.78 -1.81 -1.79 -1.93 -2.13
(-13.46)a (-13.66)a (-13.51)a (-10.97)a (-15.78)a
RET4_6 0.60 0.56 0.58 0.40 0.95
(5.52)a (5.21)a (5.41)a (2.80)a (8.66)a
RET7_12 1.09 1.06 1.08 0.97 0.98
(14.64)a (14.38)a (14.63)a (9.94)a (13.15)a
LIQUID 0.24 0.24 0.25 -0.08 -0.01
(9.04)a (9.24)a (9.31)a (-4.06)a (-0.42)
CV_LIQ -0.03 -0.13 -0.16 0.20 0.27
(-0.47) (-2.04)b (-2.78)a (3.09)a (4.44)a
D -9.89 -9.90 -9.89 -9.58 -10.32
(-140.32)a (-140.42)a (-140.35)a (-107.43)a (-142.68)a
D*LIQ_VOLATILITY -2.86 -2.39 -2.96 -0.23 -3.75
(-13.77)a (-10.15)a (-13.28)a (-0.99) (-16.15)a
_CONS 1.58 1.59 1.59 1.63 1.63
(72.34)a (72.63)a (72.55)a (53.33)a (70.67)a
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V. B. Small vs. Large 
It is worthwhile to check whether the results might be influenced by a firm size effect, 
because liquidity risk is potentially much more important for small stocks than for large stocks. 
As documented in the previous literature, firm size52 can be also a proxy for information 
asymmetry. To the extent that firm size is a proxy for information asymmetry and that 
information asymmetry influences the return-liquidity-risk relation, incorporating firm size into 
the analysis might help to resolve the liquidity risk puzzle. Therefore, we add an interaction term 
to the base equation and investigate how firm size influences the relation between liquidity risk 
and excess return. The regression equation is described as follows:
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where 
o titi VOLATILITYLIQSIZE ,, _* is an interaction term between firm size and liquidity 
volatility. The latter is measured by the coefficient of variation of alternative liquidity 
measure over month t – 37 to t – 2 for each stock. 
o ϕ is the coefficient on the interaction term. Because liquidity likely is more critical for 
smaller firms than for large firms, the coefficient of the interaction term, ϕ, is expected to 
be negative. That is, investors require smaller liquidity risk premium for larger firms.
The results are reported in Table VI. Comparing with those in Table III, the signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients on control variables and alternative liquidity measures remain 
unchanged. The signs of liquidity risk remain qualitatively the same as those in Table III; that is, 
the relation between returns and liquidity volatility is significantly negative when liquidity is 
measured by trading volume, whereas the relation is significantly positive when liquidity is 
measured by price impacts of trading. As in our analysis that incorporates market conditions, it is 
noteworthy that all negative coefficients are smaller in magnitudes, compared to Table III. 
Therefore, the inclusion of the firm size effect helps to reduce the magnitude of the puzzle but 
does not resolve it.
                                                
52 Regarding the measures of information uncertainty, Zhang (2006) provides six proxies: firm age, analyst 
coverage, cash flow volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, firm size, and stock volatility. Higher firm age, analyst 
coverage, and firm size reflect lower information uncertainty, while higher cash flow volatility, analyst dispersion, 
and stock volatility indicate higher information uncertainty.
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According to Equation (4), the impact of liquidity risk on excess return can be expressed 
as tiSIZE ,2  . As shown in regressions [1], [2], and [3], respectively, the estimated 
coefficients on the volatilities of dollar trading volume, turnover, and share trading volume, as 
well as on their interaction terms with stock size, are negative and statistically significant. 
Specifically, for one percent increase in the variation of dollar trading volume, turnover, and 
share trading volume, risk premium required by investors would reduce by 
)*29.016.0( ,tiSIZE , )*41.022.0( ,tiSIZE , and )*31.027.0( ,tiSIZE , respectively. In 
regressions [4] and [5] where liquidity is measured by Amivest liquidity and Amihud illiquidity, 
respectively, the impact of the volatility of liquidity on excess return is significantly positive, a 
result consistent with that in Table III.  The coefficients on the interaction terms are negative but 
insignificant. Therefore, the overall effect of one percent increase in volatility of Amivest 
liquidity and Amihud illiquidity on excess return is that risk premium would increase
by )*09.017.0( ,tiSIZE and )*03.031.0( ,tiSIZE , respectively. Although we observe a 
positive impact of price-based liquidity risk on excess return, this impact turns modest or even 
weak as firm size increases. That is, there is a firm size effect: The larger the firm, the lower the 
risk premium on liquidity volatility, and this is true for all liquidity measures, though 
insignificant so for price-based liquidity. 
The results in this section can be summarized as follows. We find some evidence of a 
firm size effect: liquidity risk premium is greater the smaller the firm size, regardless of the 
liquidity measure employed. As in the case of incorporating market conditions into the analysis, 
the firm size effect does not fully resolve the liquidity risk, because the signs of liquidity risk 
remain the same as those in previous sections.
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Table VI. The Impact of Firm Size on the Puzzle
This table reports the estimated coefficients in regressions [1] – [5] where liquidity is measured by Dollar 
Trading Volume, Turnover, Share Trading Volume, Amivest Liquidity, and Amihud Illiquidity, 
respectively. The sample period is from January 1975 through December 2008. An interaction term 
between firm size and liquidity volatility is added to the base equation. The regression equation is 
described as follows: 
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where tir , denotes excess return on stock i in month t;  Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock characteristic 
m for stock i in month t; M is the number of the characteristic variables. LIQUID denotes alternative 
liquidity measures. tiVOLATILITYLIQ ,_ denotes liquidity volatility. titi VOLATILITYLIQSIZE ,, _* is 
the interaction term between firm size and liquidity risk. In the table below, CV_LIQ denotes liquidity 
volatility, which is the coefficient of variation of liquidity over month t – 37 to t – 2. All variables except 
EXCESS RET, YIELD, and three momentum effect variables are expressed as the deviation from their 
monthly cross-sectional mean in each month. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by a, b, and c, respectively.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SIZE -0.40 -0.41 -0.41 -0.24 -0.33
(-7.95)a (-13.35)a (-8.29)a (-5.29)a (-6.93)a
BM 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.74 0.67
(13.18)a (13.46)a (12.76)a (11.14)a (12.77)a
PRICE 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.84 0.78
(15.78)a (16.09)a (14.77)a (11.81)a (13.71)a
YIELD -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 0.89 -0.33
(-0.42) (-0.29) (-0.40) (2.27)b (-1.48)
RET2_3 -1.64 -1.66 -1.63 -1.62 -1.99
(-12.01)a (-12.19)a (-11.96)a (-8.93)a (-14.30)a
RET4_6 0.07 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.56
(0.62) (0.30) (0.55) (-0.20) (94.97)a
RET7_12 1.18 1.14 1.16 1.14 0.95
(15.26)a (14.97)a (15.23)a (11.28)a (12.25)a
LIQUID -0.005 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 0.03
(-0.17) (-0.29) (-0.21) (-4.23)a (1.29)
CV_LIQ -0.16 -0.22 -0.27 0.17 0.31
(-2.59)b (-3.36)a (-4.41)a (2.43)b (4.72)a
SIZE*LIQ_VOLATILITY -0.29 -0.41 -0.31 -0.09 -0.03
(-5.54)a (-7.05)a (-5.49)a (-1.36) (-0.51)
_CONS 0.96 0.96 0.97 1.00 1.00
(42.43)a (41.96)a (43.20)a (32.16)a (41.94)a
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V. C. The Role of Investor Sentiment 
As discussed in the literature review, behavioral biases might help to resolve the liquidity 
risk puzzle. For instance, our previous analysis of market conditions suggests that investors are 
not strongly averse to liquidity risk during extreme down markets. Here, we are incorporating a 
measure of investor sentiment and check whether it can affect the return-liquidity risk relation.
Prior literature presents several measures of investor sentiment, which is referred to the level of 
noise traders’ beliefs relative to Bayesian beliefs (Tetlock (2007)). One of them is the VIX index, 
which we employ here. Some document a significantly negative relation between investor 
sentiment and stock return. However to our knowledge, no article provides either theoretical 
prediction or empirical evidence on whether investor sentiment affects liquidity risk premium. 
Since irrational investors behave like a herd, rushing in and out of markets together, increasing 
the size of the herd does little to support liquidity, indeed it could reduce it and causes those 
markets to exhibit even greater volatility. Therefore, the following empirical analysis might 
provide additional insights to the negative liquidity risk premium puzzle:
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where 
o tVIX is a measure of the level of implied volatility of a wide range of options based on 
the S&P 500. It is referred to as the Investor Fear Gauge, as pointed out in Whaley 
(2000)53, and can be a proxy of investor sentiment. 
o tit VOLATILITYLIQVIX ,_* is an interaction term between investor fear gauge and 
liquidity volatility. The liquidity risk is also measured by the coefficient of variation of 
the liquidity over month t – 37 to t – 2.
o 21 and  are the coefficients on tVIX and the interaction term, respectively. Although 
the evidence on this issue is lacking, it is expected that the proxy for investor sentiment 
would help to explain the relationship between liquidity risk and excess return. In other 
words, the negative relation between excess return and liquidity risk premium might be 
                                                
53
Whaley (2000) use the VIX-Investor Fear Gauge as a measure of investor sentiment. This measure is computed 
daily by the Chicago Board Options Exchange and has been widely used by academicians and practitioners as 
measures of investor sentiment to gauge the prevailing level of bullishness or bearishness in the market. 
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partly due to the frequent trading or large trading activity of optimistic investors or 
investor sentiment. 
The data on VIX is available only since January 1990, while our previous analysis covers 
a much longer period. Consequently we report results with and without the VIX index for the 
period 1990 to 2008. The results are displayed in Table VII, where column (a) reports the results 
without the VIX and its interaction term with liquidity volatility (that is, column (a) involves the 
same analysis as Table III but with a different sample period) and column (b) reports those with 
the VIX and its interaction term. 
Table VII shows that volume-based-liquidity continues to demonstrate mixed results. 
Without the VIX index, the relation between return and volume is insignificant in regressions [1] 
to [3]; with the VIX index included, the relation becomes significantly positive in all three 
regressions, which contradicts a compensation for low liquidity and casts doubt on the validity of 
volume as a measure of liquidity. As for the signs for the price impact measures, they remain the 
same as in the previous analyses and consistent with the notion that investors require greater 
return for lower liquidity. Regarding the coefficients of liquidity volatility, here we observe a 
striking difference between results including and excluding the VIX index. Simply stated, 
without the VIX index, the coefficients of liquidity volatility are largely mixed as in our earlier 
analyses. When the VIX index and its interaction term are included, the coefficients of liquidity 
volatility are significantly positive in four out of five regressions and consistent with a tradeoff 
between returns and risk. The only exception is in regression [5], where the Amihud ratio is used 
as the measure of liquidity. We do not have satisfactory explanation for the result using the 
Amihud ratio. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that results here after controlling for investor 
sentiment are strongest among all our analyses in support of a positive tradeoff between risk and 
return.
The coefficients of the VIX index are uniformly negative and significant in all 
regressions. This is not surprising as a high VIX index suggests greater investor fear, which 
tends to be associated with down markets. The coefficients of the interaction term, 
tit VOLATILITYLIQVIX ,_* , are significantly negative in all regressions with the exception of, 
again, the one using the Amihud ratio (regression [5]). A negative coefficient of the interaction 
term might be explained by an argument similar to that of the Prospect Theory, as follows. When 
investors’ fear is high, they might engage in active trading and some of the trades might not be 
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rational; alternatively, when the market fear is high, risk-averse investors might opt out, leaving 
only traders for whom liquidity volatility is not a major concern. However, it should be pointed 
out when VIX is high, the combined coefficient of liquidity volatility and the interaction term 
might become negative (we use the log of VIX in the regression, and the long-term average of 
VIX is roughly 20). Therefore, the results here do not unambiguously point to a positive tradeoff 
between return and liquidity risk; more specifically the results suggest that a positive tradeoff 
between returns and liquidity risk is true when the level of fear is not too high. To further explore 
the role of investor sentiment, fuller theoretical development is needed.  Nevertheless, the results 
here do suggest that investor sentiment plays a role in the relation between returns and liquidity 
risk.54
                                                
54 It is possible that firms’ market/book ratios might be proxies for investors’ sentiment. Consequently, we perform a 
similar analysis based on market/book ratio and the results are listed in Table A3 in the appendix.
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Table VII. The Impact of Investor Sentiment 
This table reports the estimated coefficients in regressions [1] – [5] where liquidity is measured by Dollar Trading Volume, Turnover, 
Share Trading Volume, Amivest Liquidity, and Amihud Illiquidity, respectively. The sample period is from January 1990 through 
December 2008. The regression equation is described as follows:
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where tir , denotes excess return on stock i in month t;  Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock characteristic m for stock i in month t; M 
is the number of the characteristic variables. LIQUID denotes alternative liquidity measures. tiVOLATILITYLIQ ,_ denotes liquidity 
volatility. tVIX denotes investor sentiment and is expressed as the logarithm of the level of implied volatility of a wide range of 
options based on the S&P 500. tit VOLATILITYLIQVIX ,_* is the interaction term between investor sentiment and liquidity risk. In 
the table below, CV_LIQ denotes liquidity risk which is the coefficient of variation of liquidity, over month t – 37 to t – 2. All 
variables except EXCESS RET, YIELD, and three momentum effect variables are expressed as the deviation from their monthly cross-
sectional mean in each month. In this table, column (a) reports the results without the VIX and its interaction term with liquidity 
volatility (that is, column (a) involves the same analysis as Table III but with a different sample period) and column (b) reports those 
with the VIX and its interaction term. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by a, b, and c, respectively. 
96
Table VII. (Continued)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
SIZE -0.49 -0.49 -0.53 -0.44 -0.50 -0.56 -0.35 -0.14 -0.39 -0.11
(-7.06)a (-7.18)a (-11.90)a (-9.88)a (-7.37)a (-8.33)a (-5.67)a (-2.30)b (-6.48)a (-1.90)c
BM 0.66 0.53 0.66 0.50 0.64 0.51 0.70 0.43 0.68 0.56
(9.95)a (8.04)a (9.97)a (7.69)a (9.58)a (7.71)a (8.76)a (5.48)a (10.56)a (8.80)a
PRICE 0.88 1.09 0.89 1.07 0.91 0.93 0.79 1.01 0.93 1.01
(11.81)a (14.70)a (11.99)a (14.45)a (10.93)a (11.22)a (8.70)a (11.26)a (12.54)a (13.81)a
YIELD 0.02 -0.22 0.07 -0.23 0.05 -0.24 0.76 0.60 0.03 -0.11
(0.07 (-0.69) (0.20 (-0.72) (0.15 (-0.74) (1.65)c (1.31) (0.09) (-0.33)
RET2_3 -1.04 -1.94 -1.03 -1.87 -1.03 -1.88 -1.18 -2.40 -1.04 -1.87
(-5.51)a (-10.37)a (-5.48)a (-10.01)a (-5.49)a (-10.07)a (-5.06)a (-10.31)a (-5.69)a (-10.26)a
RET4_6 0.03 -0.45 0.03 -0.38 0.02 -0.38 0.06 -0.40 -0.09 -0.44
(0.21) (-2.95)a (0.17) (-2.47)b (0.13) (-2.52)b (0.31) (-2.11)b (-0.62) (-2.94)a
RET7_12 1.91 1.53 1.90 1.61 1.89 1.60 1.71 1.28 1.66 1.46
(17.29)a (13.97)a (17.43)a (14.88)a (17.39)a (14.78)a (12.63)a (9.57)a (16.16)a (14.35)a
LIQUID 0.0002 0.12 0.01 0.15 -0.0003 0.14 -0.10 -0.22 0.02 0.16
(0.00) (3.28)a (0.14) (4.08)a (-0.01) (3.88)a (-3.85)a (-8.49)a (0.54) (4.84)a
CV_LIQ -0.22 2.88 -0.53 2.36 -0.41 1.90 0.08 2.72 0.48 -3.15
(-2.81)a (4.47)a (-6.24)a (3.30)a (-5.25)a (2.84)a (1.02) (4.21)a (6.13)a (-4.91)a
VIX -4.20 -4.15 -4.14 -4.61 -3.97
(-55.03)a (-54.66)a (-54.78)a (-51.34)a (-53.37)a
VIX*LIQ_VOLATILITY -0.89 -0.83 -0.63 -0.90 1.19
(-4.04)a (-3.42)a (-2.78)a (-4.09)a (5.37)a
_CONS 1.08 13.33 1.10 13.16 1.08 13.14 1.15 14.68 1.11 12.64
(30.80)a (59.13)a (31.25)a (58.83)a (30.93)a (58.91)a (24.79)a (54.90)a (32.00)a (57.86)a
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VI. Conclusions and Contributions
Under traditional theories, return and liquidity risk should be positively related. 
Therefore, the finding of a negative relation between return and trading volume documented by 
Chordia et al. (2001b) presents a “liquidity risk puzzle”. This study attempts to resolve the 
puzzle on two fronts: 1) since liquidity cannot be adequately captured by one variable, we 
employ alternative liquidity measures; and 2) since behavioral biases might help to explain the 
puzzle, we incorporate market conditions, firm size, and investor sentiment into our analysis. 
Our sample covers the period 1975 to 2008 and the total number of firm-month 
observations is 415,403. The main findings are as follows. The relation between stock returns 
and volatility of liquidity does depend on the measure of liquidity. We use three liquidity 
measures that are based on trading volume and two on price impacts of trading. Liquidity based 
on trading volume produces most mixed results: not only the relation between returns and 
volume volatility are insignificant or negative, the relation between returns and the level of 
trading is often positive in our analyses. These results cast serious doubt on the appropriateness 
of volume as a proxy for liquidity. They also reinforce the argument by Johnson (2008) that 
trading volume does not adequately capture liquidity. On the other hand, the puzzle largely 
disappears when liquidity is measured by Amivest liquidity and Amihud illiquidity ratios that are 
based on price impacts. A partial reconciliation of the differences in results using alternative 
liquidity measures is that price impact is arguably more important than the volume of trading for 
at least the large traders. We also find that results are sensitive to sample periods. One thing that 
we can conclude is that a negative liquidity risk premium is not a robust result. 
The second part of our paper incorporates potential factors that might affect the relation 
between returns and liquidity volatility, namely possible differential risk attitude in different 
market conditions, a possible firm size effect, and investor sentiments. Our results indicate that 
in extreme down markets, the aversion to liquidity volatility is lower and in fact the evidence 
suggests returns are lower the greater the liquidity volatility under down markets. We interpret 
the evidence as consistent with behavioral biases, especially that along the line of the Prospect 
Theory. Nevertheless, the inclusion of market conditions does not alter the mixed relation 
between returns and liquidity volatility, although it tends to reduce the magnitude of the puzzle. 
The inclusion of firm size also reduces the magnitude of the puzzle but does not completely 
resolve the puzzle. Additionally, we find a firm size effect; specifically, liquidity risk premium 
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tends to be greater for small stocks. Finally, when we include the VIX index as a proxy for 
investor sentiment, we find that the relation between returns and liquidity risk is significantly 
positive in four out of five liquidity measures. This result suggests that investor sentiment might 
have the potential to more fully resolve the puzzle. In sum, our analysis partially but not 
completely addresses the puzzle. Further theoretical development is desirable. 
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Figure I. Time Series Plots of Liquidity Measures
The figures below show the monthly cross-sectional average of dollar trading volume, turnover, 
share trading volume, and Amihud Illiquidity, respectively, throughout the full sample period.
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Appendix
Table A1. Regression without Liquidity Risk Measure
This table reports the estimated coefficients in regressions [1] – [5] where liquidity is measured 
by Dollar Trading Volume, Turnover, Share Trading Volume, Amivest Liquidity, and Amihud 
Illiquidity, respectively. The sample period is from January 1975 through December 2008. The 
excess returns are used as the dependent variable in the following regression:
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where tir , denotes excess return on stock i in month t;  Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock 
characteristic m for stock i in month t; M is the number of the characteristic variables. LIQUID
denotes alternative liquidity measures. All variables except EXCESS RET, YIELD, and three 
momentum effect variables are expressed as the deviation from their monthly cross-sectional 
mean in each month. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by a, b, and c, respectively. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SIZE -0.32 -0.36 -0.32 -0.29 -0.23
(-6.92)a (-13.08)a (-6.92)a (-8.45)a (-5.31)a
BM 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.75
(14.87)a (14.87)a (14.87)a (14.79)a (15.44)a
PRICE 0.96 0.96 1.01 0.95 0.88
(18.07)a (18.07)a (16.81)a (17.64)a (16.62)a
YIELD -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.04 -0.19
(-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.16) (-0.84)
RET2_3 -1.56 -1.56 -1.56 -1.59 -1.64
(-11.98)a (-11.98)a (-11.98)a (-12.18)a (-12.69)a
RET4_6 -0.02 -0.02 -0.025 -0.01 0.30
(-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.07) (2.82)a
RET7_12 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.17 1.27
(16.92)a (16.92)a (16.92)a (16.55)a (18.19)a
LIQUID -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.05
(-1.75)c (-1.75)c (-1.75)c (-3.95)a (2.21)b
_CONS 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.90
(46.14)a (46.14)a (46.14)a (45.45)a (41.51)a
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Table A2. Regression of Excess Return on the First Difference of 
Non-Stationary Explanatory Variables
This table reports the estimated coefficients in regressions [1] – [5] where liquidity is measured by Dollar 
Trading Volume, Turnover, Share Trading Volume, Amivest Liquidity, and Amihud Illiquidity, 
respectively. The sample period is from January 1975 through December 2008. The excess returns are 
used as the dependent variable in the following regression:
          _ ,,2,1,,
1
0, titititim
M
m
mti eVOLATILITYLIQLIQUIDZccr  


where tir , denotes excess return on stock i in month t;  Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock characteristic 
m for stock i in month t; M is the number of the characteristic variables. LIQUID denotes alternative 
liquidity measures. tiVOLATILITYLIQ ,_ denotes liquidity volatility. In the table below, CV_LIQ denotes 
liquidity risk which is the coefficient of variation of liquidity, over month t – 37 to t – 2. All variables 
except EXCESS RET, YIELD, and three momentum effect variables are expressed as the deviation from 
their monthly cross-sectional mean in each month. The first differences of the non-stationary explanatory 
variables - SIZE, BM, PRICE, YIELD, LIQUID, and LIQ_VOLATILITY – are used in the regressions. All 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are denoted by a, b, and c, respectively. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SIZE -1.37 -1.48 -1.37 -1.69 -0.99
(-3.98)a (-4.31)a (-3.96)a (-3.79)a (-2.80)a
BM 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.09 0.42
(2.74)a (2.75)a (2.75)a (0.39) (2.45)b
PRICE 0.57 0.58 0.69 0.40 0.51
(2.05)b (2.08)b (2.46)b (1.16) (1.78)c
YIELD 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.60 0.99
(1.80)c (1.81)c (1.80)c (1.52) (1.68)c
RET2_3 -1.06 -1.05 -1.05 -0.86 -1.64
(-6.04)a (-6.00)a (-6.03)a (-3.64)a (-9.08)a
RET4_6 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.54 0.25
(-3.05)a (-3.05)a (-3.04)a (-3.44)a (2.08)b
RET7_12 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.27
(4.87)a (4.86)a (4.88)a (3.81)a (3.72)a
LIQUID -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 0.03
(-2.94)a (-2.68)a (-2.78)a (-3.04)a (0.74)
CV_LIQ 0.01 -0.37 -0.13 0.39 0.44
(0.06) (-1.39) (-0.52) (1.94)b (1.62)c
_CONS 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.83 0.88
(47.04)a (47.09)a (47.07)a (31.23)a (42.82)a
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Table A3. The Impact of Value Stocks on the Puzzle
This table reports the estimated coefficients in regressions [1] – [5] where liquidity is measured by Dollar 
Trading Volume, Turnover, Share Trading Volume, Amivest Liquidity, and Amihud Illiquidity, 
respectively. The sample period is from January 1975 through December 2008. An interaction term 
between firm book-to-market ratio and liquidity volatility is added to the base equation. The regression 
equation is described as follows: 
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where tir , denotes excess return on stock i in month t;  Zm,i,t is the value of the specific stock characteristic 
m for stock i in month t; M is the number of the characteristic variables. LIQUID denotes alternative 
liquidity measures. tiVOLATILITYLIQ ,_ denotes liquidity volatility. titi VOLATILITYLIQBM ,, _* is 
the interaction term between firm book-to-market ratio and liquidity risk. In the table below, CV_LIQ
denotes liquidity volatility which is the coefficient of variation of liquidity over month t – 37 to t – 2. All 
variables except EXCESS RET, YIELD, and three momentum effect variables are expressed as the 
deviation from their monthly cross-sectional mean in each month. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by a, b, and 
c, respectively.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SIZE -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.24 -0.33
(-8.12)a (-13.62)a (-8.51)a (-5.28)a (-7.06)a
BM 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.74 0.67
(13.17)a (13.44)a (12.75)a (11.12)a (12.73)a
PRICE 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.84 0.78
(15.85)a (16.08)a (14.70)a (11.80)a (13.62)a
YIELD -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 0.88 -0.33
(-0.55) (-0.45) (-0.50) (2.25)b (-1.49)
RET2_3 -1.65 -1.66 -1.63 -1.62 -2.01
(-12.06)a (-12.16)a (-11.96)a (-8.93)a (-14.40)a
RET4_6 0.07 0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.56
(0.66) (0.41) (0.62) (-0.21) (4.91)a
RET7_12 1.20 1.16 1.18 1.14 0.96
(15.58)a (15.26)a (15.45)a (11.28)a (12.37)a
LIQUID -0.001 -0.003 -0.0002 -0.09 0.03
(-0.05) (-0.11) (-0.01) (-4.26)a (1.10)
CV_LIQ -0.24 -0.33 -0.37 0.13 0.33
(-4.00)a (-5.20)a (-6.26)a (2.06)b (5.23)a
BM*LIQ_VOLATILITY 0.47 0.39 0.28 0.03 0.51
(4.13)a (3.02)a (2.28)b (0.23) (4.02)a
_CONS 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
(44.19)a (44.18)a (44.72)a (32.13)a (42.54)a
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